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Foreword
 
Migration and close economic linkages with the Di-
aspora population are an everyday reality for most 
people in Kosovo. One out of every four Kosovans 
currently lives abroad. Financial flows from mem-
bers of the Diaspora - including migrant remittances 
and travel expenditures - correspond to one fifth of 
Kosovo’s Gross Domestic Product. This report con-
siders the impact of migration on human develop-
ment in Kosovo.  In addition to the economic impact 
the report also examines the social impact of remit-
tances (e.g. increased political and civic participa-
tion), as well as related changes in behaviour and 
attitude.  The report also explores freedom of mo-
bility and its impact on human development beyond 
remittances.
The 2009 Global Human Development Report iden-
tified numerous ways in which migration promotes 
and also impedes human development in the mi-
grants’ countries of origin. The 2014 Kosovo Hu-
man Development Report applies the lessons from 
the Global Report to the particular circumstances of 
Kosovo and focusses on how migration and links 
with the Diaspora affect human development in 
Kosovo.
Two findings from the report stand out:
First, if we understand human development to be 
essentially about expanding people’s choices to lead 
high-quality lives, the decision to migrate is itself an 
important factor in human development. In Kosovo, 
economic opportunities are limited by geographic 
location, uneven relationships with neighbouring 
countries, and a history of institutional development 
that makes good governance and implementation of 
effective public policies a persistent challenge. Un-
der these circumstances, opportunities for employ-
ment, study or travel abroad for business or leisure 
afford people in Kosovo a chance to transcend what 
is otherwise a relatively confined set of choices. 
The availability of opportunities for legal employ-
ment abroad very much depends, however, on the 
relationship of Kosovo to its international partners. 
Visa-free short-term travel to the Schengen Area 
would make a significant contribution to interna-
tional mobility, but progress on this front will de-
pend on the pace at which Kosovo can implement 
the EU visa liberalization roadmap. 
Second, the report highlights how linkages with the 
Kosovo Diaspora contribute in multiple ways to the 
human development of Kosovo residents. Migrant 
remittances, labour income from short-term work-
ers abroad, travel expenditures of migrants visiting 
Kosovo, and other international reserve flows to the 
economy of Kosovo serve to strengthen demand for 
domestic goods and services in Kosovo and boost 
the demand for local workers. While unemployment 
is indeed very high in Kosovo, it would be even high-
er, and wages lower, without this extra demand for 
local goods and services. Furthermore, households 
that receive remittances are able to escape poverty 
and spend more on education and health care.  
Nevertheless, migration and remittances alone can-
not guarantee sustainable economic growth and 
human development. The design and implementa-
tion of effective public policies will be critical for 
improving the investment climate in Kosovo and 
for laying the necessary foundation for sustained 
growth of output and incomes. Ensuring adequate 
levels of public investment in both the quality of and 
access to education and health care for all Kosovans 
will also be a key requirement. 
As those living in the Diaspora become more inte-
grated in their host countries, they will need to adopt 
a more “transnational” way of life if they wish to 
maintain close links to Kosovo. The report recom-
mends a variety of measures that the authorities of 
Kosovo can consider to strengthen and to take better 
advantage of the connections between the Diaspo-
ra and Kosovo, including networking activities on 
areas of common interest for Diaspora members 
and Kosovo-based groups, establishment of cultural 
centres abroad, provision of reserved seats for Dias-
pora representatives in the Kosovo parliament, and 
financial incentives for contributions by the Diaspo-
ra to development projects in Kosovo. In the years 
to come, these are just some of the actions that could 
contribute to strengthening long-term and mutual-
ly beneficial cooperation between Kosovans living 
abroad and those who choose to stay.
Andrew  Russell
UN Development Coordinator
UNDP Resident Representative
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Executive
Summary
Labour migration and economic interaction with the 
Kosovan Diaspora abroad have a profound impact 
on the economic opportunities and livelihoods of 
many individuals in Kosovo. This is not just limited 
to the household level. Economic interactions with 
the Kosovan Diaspora are so pervasive that they 
strongly influence Kosovo’s macroeconomic devel-
opment and, hence, all Kosovans.
In this 2014 Kosovo Human Development Report, 
we take a close look at how labour migration and 
interactions with the Diaspora affect human devel-
opment in Kosovo. While human development has 
many different dimensions, this report concentrates 
on opportunities for productive employment (wheth-
er in Kosovo or abroad), material wellbeing and 
poverty reduction. Focus is also placed on access 
to education and healthcare (through higher income 
or access to services abroad), the circumstances of 
women migrants and women-headed households, 
and the impact of international mobility on social 
involvement and political participation. On this ba-
sis, we draw out the implications for policy inter-
ventions that seek to promote human development 
and especially to engage the Diaspora in Kosovo’s 
future.
This report is inspired by UNDP’s 2009 Global Hu-
man Development Report on migration and human 
development and draws on the findings of that re-
port to better understand the possible linkages be-
tween migration, remittances, the Diaspora, and hu-
man development. At the Kosovo level, the analysis 
is based on existing empirical studies, Kosovo-lev-
el economic and population statistics, and primary 
data from several household and opinion surveys.
After a short overview on “how does migration 
contribute to human development?” (Chapter 1), 
we begin our report by assessing the demographic 
aspects of emigration from Kosovo and the size of 
the Diaspora (Chapter 2). Initially young workers, 
mostly men, sought better employment opportu-
nities abroad. From 1989, the worsening political 
climate and growing unemployment among Koso-
vo-Albanians caused a large exodus, with many mi-
grants settling in Switzerland and Germany.
During the 1998/ 1999 conflict, many individuals 
sought refuge in neighbouring countries and across 
Western Europe; a large share of these refugees re-
turned to Kosovo after conditions stabilized. Since 
2000, there has been a steady outflow of migrants in 
response to high unemployment and the lack of eco-
nomic opportunities in Kosovo. At the most general 
level, labour migration affects human development 
in two ways.
First, having the option of seeking employment 
abroad expands the choices open to Kosovan work-
ers, with choice being a major contributor to human 
development. In recent years, approximately 36,000 
individuals entered the labour market annually while 
about 10,000 retired; at the same time, approximate-
ly 13,000 individuals left Kosovo to work, study, or 
just live abroad. In opinion surveys, approximately 
half the respondents between 18 and 36 years (and 
more than one third of all respondents) typically say 
they plan to migrate. These figures demonstrate the 
great importance of international mobility for Koso-
vans’ life choices.
Secondly, the outflow of migrants has resulted in a 
Diaspora that interacts with households in Kosovo 
in various ways that may promote human develop-
ment. These include, but are not limited to, remit-
tances, travel expenditures in Kosovo, and invest-
ment in real estate and in businesses (we discuss 
these in detail in Chapter 3). Economic interactions 
are reflected in Kosovo’s balance of payments and 
their volume is therefore known in principle. How-
ever, estimates of the size of the Diaspora vary 
widely.
A lower boundary estimate is available from the 
2011 Kosovo Census that asks about any former 
household members that now live abroad. The Cen-
sus finds that approximately 380,000 people are 
“actively remembered” by their former households 
which, it is perhaps safe to conclude, means that 
most of them are still involved with Kosovan house-
holds and with the Kosovo economy.
For our upper boundary estimates, we compare 
Kosovo’s actual resident population according to the 
2011 Census (just under 1.8 million, after adjusting 
for undercounting in the Northern municipalities) 
to its hypothetical population under the assumption 
that all individuals born since the 1981 census still 
live in Kosovo (2.65 million, taking into account cu-
mulative births and deaths).
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The difference (approximately 874,000) constitutes 
our rough upper boundary estimate of net emigra-
tion and the size of the Diaspora outside Kosovo: 
approximately 579,000 Kosovo-Albanians, 175,000 
Kosovo-Serbs, and 120,000 individuals of other 
ethnicities. This upper estimate is subject to several 
uncertainties. In particular, since there were proba-
bly more births than deaths among emigrants from 
Kosovo, the Diaspora including the second genera-
tion will be larger than our estimate.
We draw two conclusions from these widely differ-
ing estimates:
First, even if we take the lower estimate, the Kosovo 
Diaspora is large by any reasonable standard, with 
approximately one emigrant for every five Kosovo 
residents. There is clearly room for an active Dias-
pora policy to involve Kosovo emigrants abroad in 
promoting human development in Kosovo.
Second, the notion of being a member of the Koso-
vo Diaspora has many different facets and needs 
to be carefully thought through depending on the 
policy intervention in question. For example, some 
emigrants may be citizens of their host countries, 
but may be happy to support charitable projects in 
Kosovo, have their children learn Albanian, and 
maintain cultural practices. Therefore, some Dias-
pora policies may be relevant to them.
Following our assessment of the size of the Diaspo-
ra, we review the economic interactions of Diaspora 
members with the Kosovo economy at the aggre-
gate (Kosovo-wide) level and place Diaspora-re-
lated international reserve inflows in the context 
of Kosovo’s macroeconomic development (Chap-
ter 3). Short-term migrants and Diaspora members 
not only transfer labour income and remittances to 
Kosovo (approximately 15 percent of Gross Domes-
tic Product). They also visit Kosovo regularly and 
spend a considerable amount of money during vis-
its, especially on domestic services (around 6 per-
cent of GDP). Furthermore, Diaspora members play 
an important role in facilitating foreign investment 
in Kosovo and many invest in real estate, strength-
ening demand for construction services.
While some Diaspora members and households 
with migrants also invest in Kosovo businesses, we 
find that the investment climate in Kosovo overall 
leaves much to be desired. As a result, many poten-
tial investors are unable to implement their projects 
safely and effectively and some investment plans 
are not realized. Existing policies to support busi-
ness investment at the central and local levels are 
hampered by limited resources.
These reserve inflows have been remarkably resil-
ient in the face of the recent financial crisis, suf-
fering only a mild reduction in 2009 after which a 
quick and full recovery took place.
Furthermore, no evidence has been found to suggest 
that remittances decline as emigrants become more 
fully integrated in their host countries and links with 
Kosovo weaken. While this is a plausible concern, 
the close links of current emigrants to their extend-
ed families in Kosovo seem also to combine with a 
steady outflow of new migrants (potential remitters) 
to generate a broadly stable inflow of international 
reserves. The macroeconomic effects of these large 
international reserve inflows affect human develop-
ment in several ways.
Firstly, Kosovans collectively can consume and 
invest more than they produce domestically (tech-
nically speaking, domestic absorption is higher 
than Gross Domestic Product). In a relatively poor, 
post-conflict territory, higher private and govern-
ment consumption serve to enhance individual 
well-being and the choices people have, in other 
words higher consumption enhances human devel-
opment. Secondly, the increase in demand for do-
mestic goods and services has no doubt contribut-
ed to the doubling of the headline average monthly 
wage in Kosovo to just under €400 over the last ten 
years. All workers in Kosovo benefit from higher 
wages and the consequent opportunities for human 
development, whether or not their households indi-
vidually receive migrant remittances. 
The flip side of this is a possible decline in the com-
petitiveness of the labour market. However, the wage 
level in Kosovo is still comparatively low in relation 
to neighbouring countries; what is really needed to 
improve competitiveness is improved provision of 
other factors of production such as public physical 
and social infrastructure.From macroeconomic ef-
fects, we turn to household level effects of foreign 
income and migrant remittances (Chapter 4). We 
use household survey data to assess the incidence 
of remittances and their impact on absolute poverty, 
expenditure on education and health care, and busi-
ness investment. The incidence and value of remit-
tances vary by area of residence and by ethnicity. 
Although rural and urban households have more or 
less equal probability of having a family member 
abroad, rural households are slightly more likely to 
receive remittances and they receive, on average, a 
larger amount.
Compared to other ethnicities, Kosovo-Albanian 
households are considerably more likely to have a 
migrant abroad, and are more likely to receive re-
mittances. K-Serb households are the least likely 
both to have a migrant (including in Serbia) and to 
receive remittances, after controlling for migration 
incidence; however, they enjoy the highest average 
amount of remittances. K-Other households (includ-
ing K-Roma/ Ashkali/ Egyptians) stand between 
K-Albanians and K-Serbs in terms of the incidence 
of migration and remittances; K-Roma/ Ashkali/ 
Egyptians receive lower remittances than all other 
groups.
Remittance receipts are, on average, associated with 
a lower probability of a household living in (abso-
lute) poverty, and with a higher level of consump-
tion. Remittance recipient households are also more 
likely to own particular consumer durables. Finally, 
controlling for relevant household characteristics 
(including regular income), remittances are found to 
have a positive effect on expenditure on health and 
education, as well as on the probability that a house-
hold invests in business activities.
Migration poses special opportunities and challeng-
es for migrant women and for vulnerable individu-
als left behind in Kosovo, including women as well 
as elderly people (Chapter 5). Migrant women indi-
cate that they have left Kosovo mostly for marriage 
and family-related reasons, although employment 
has become a more important motivation in recent 
years. Female migrants fare better in the labour mar-
ket than women in Kosovo. Further, more women 
than men improved their education status while 
abroad, thus experiencing human capital develop-
ment. Since more women than men hold permanent 
status in the host countries, their potential to bene-
fit from education, employment and social schemes 
is also greater. Most female migrants speak at least 
one foreign language which contributes to greater 
integration. One new finding in this research is that 
female migrants play a much smaller role as remit-
ters than men, which is not sufficiently explained 
by their lower employment ratio. Traditional gender 
roles and affiliations have been highlighted as one 
potential explanation for this.
Turning to potentially vulnerable groups in Koso-
vo, women-headed households are especially likely 
to have someone living abroad; furthermore, those 
that have a migrant abroad are somewhat more like-
ly than similar male-headed households to receive 
remittances (73 percent vs. 68 percent according to 
a 2011 survey). Remittances, if received, add on av-
erage €150 to the monthly budget of women-headed 
households vs. €124 for male -headed households. 
While spending patterns do not differ that much, 
male headed households spend more on durables 
and a little less on housing and human investments 
than female headed households. Interestingly, wom-
en spend twice as much as men on business invest-
ments.
We also conducted two focus group discussions to 
investigate important issues that are not reflected 
well in available quantitative data. The first focus 
group discussed the impact of social remittances on 
women whose migrant husbands are abroad – i.e. 
values, ideas, behaviours, and practices that may be 
experienced by migrants in their host country and 
related back to their families in the country of origin. 
Overall, focus group participants felt that migration 
had greatly contributed to the economic wellbeing 
of families left behind. While burdening women 
with additional familial responsibilities, migration 
had at the same time enhanced their confidence 
and decision-making power. One negative conse-
quence of migration may be less independence for 
daughters because mothers and grandparents tend to 
feel more responsible for them and tend to become 
over-protective. Our second focus group dealt with 
migration-induced changes in how households care 
for their elderly and infirm members. In Kosovo, 
there are not many institutions that care for the el-
derly and infirm and it would be considered socially 
inappropriate for a family not to take care of their 
relatives in that situation. As families are typically 
large, family members tend to negotiate who will 
stay at home to provide care and who will migrate. 
The remittances are focused on the elderly individ-
ual in the household, helping to cover the cost of 
living and especially any payments for health care. 
At the same time, the remittances bring benefit to all 
household members including, for example, young 
care-givers who are then able to continue their ed-
ucation.
Access to education has long been identified as a 
key aspect of human capital formation and human 
development (Chapter 6). While higher disposable 
income due to remittances means that households 
can invest more in their human capital formation 
(Chapter 4), the relationship between migration and 
educational attainment is more complex. Having a 
migrant in the family gives access to a network that 
Kosovo Human Development Report 2014xIV
MIGRATION AS A FORCE FOR DEVELOPMENT xV
may enable young family members of working age 
to obtain a job abroad for which a higher education 
level is not necessary. As a result, education may be-
come less attractive. Our survey data suggests that 
young people aged 16 – 25 years old are less likely 
to pursue a higher education if they are in a house-
hold that receives remittances. However, regression 
analysis shows that remittances are no longer asso-
ciated with the educational attendance of 16 - 25 
year olds when other determinants are properly con-
sidered. Instead, the number of household members, 
their average age, and the average educational level 
of all adult family members were more powerful in 
predicting education attendance.
Since opportunities for university education in 
Kosovo are limited in terms of subjects and quality, 
some migrants indicate that further study is the pri-
mary purpose of their stay abroad (approximately 
2 percent of migrants according to some surveys). 
Evidence suggests that a significant proportion of 
migrants have attained a higher level of education 
than they had at the time of their departure. Thus, 
study abroad is an additional channel through which 
international mobility promotes human capital for-
mation in Kosovo.
Similarly, many individuals who require health care, 
especially for certain serious illnesses, obtain it out-
side Kosovo (Chapter 7). Kosovo-Serbs are partic-
ularly likely to do so, presumably because for them 
access to the main hospital in Kosovo (University 
Clinical Centre Prishtina/Priština) is particularly 
difficult or costly. Individuals in households that re-
ceive remittances report higher health expenditures.
Finally, in the spirit of the social remittances litera-
ture, we investigate how short or long term interna-
tional mobility, having a migrant in one’s household 
or receiving remittances affect individuals’ political 
and social involvement in Kosovo (Chapter 8). 
Remarkably, we find a significant positive correla-
tion only for short-term mobility. Individuals with 
previous travel experience abroad are more likely 
to participate in local community projects, public 
debates, to be members of political parties or to be 
involved in NGOs. While causality may run both 
ways (i.e. more socially and politically active in-
dividuals might also simply travel more), it seems 
safe to conclude that among Kosovo residents, in-
ternational travel experience and social and political 
engagement are mutually reinforcing.
We take a close look at how the Kosovan Diaspora is 
organized in order to better understand how it could 
be motivated to contribute more actively to human 
development within Kosovo. During the conflict 
years, members of the Diaspora mounted well-orga-
nized financial and logistical support for those who 
struggled to survive in Kosovo. However, the cohe-
sion of the Diaspora has now lessened. What may 
be perceived as factionalism within Kosovo politics 
appears to put off some Diaspora members who are 
now familiar with the political cultures of Western 
Europe. Also, naturally, many Diaspora members 
are establishing a firmer foothold socially and eco-
nomically in their host countries. Many prominent 
politicians and members of the Kosovo government 
have spent extended periods of time in Western Eu-
rope with its more transparent and participatory po-
litical culture, but they have transferred little of that 
to Kosovo.
In drawing together the policy recommendation of 
this report (Chapter 9), we emphasize that migra-
tion and remittances, in and of themselves, will not 
lead to sustainable economic growth and human de-
velopment in the medium to long run. Good gov-
ernance and effective public policies are crucial to 
improve the investment climate in Kosovo and lay 
the foundation for sustained growth of output and 
incomes. Remittances cannot be relied upon to pro-
vide for all individuals in need. Targeted social assis-
tance is needed to ensure that vulnerable individuals 
do not fall into poverty; education and health care 
need to be provided and financed in ways that make 
them accessible to all. Given this broader context, 
Kosovo authorities may usefully implement mea-
sures that would make it easier for members of the 
Diaspora to maintain links with Kosovo even while 
they become fully integrated in their host coun-
tries. Cultural centres abroad, networking events 
for prominent Diaspora members and Kosovo rep-
resentatives, and the planned National Council of 
K-Albanian Diaspora all promise to strengthen Di-
aspora identification. To ensure wide involvement 
Diaspora members should participate in key roles to 
implement these activities. The Kosovo authorities’ 
National Strategy for Diaspora 2013-2018 estab-
lishes a useful framework to develop these policies 
further. Furthermore, to convey a sense of appreci-
ation for the Diaspora’s contribution to Kosovo’s 
economic and social development, a small number 
of reserved seats in the Kosovo-wide parliament 
should be allocated to the Diaspora similar to the 
system for ethnic minorities. 
Regarding Diaspora voting rights at the local level, a 
comprehensive analysis would be required to assess 
whether Diaspora members are sufficiently well-in-
formed on development trends in their communities 
to justify their participation in local elections.
We find scope for extending exchange programmes 
for university as well as vocational students. This 
could involve summer internships in Kosovo for Di-
aspora and Kosovo students at universities abroad; 
periods of study abroad (Erasmus style); or long-
term scholarships for study abroad if recipients 
commit to working for Kosovo authorities after 
their studies.
The incentive for Diaspora contributions to social 
and economic development projects in Kosovo (col-
lective remittances) could be strengthened if donors 
could provide matching funds or other support. In-
volvement by Diaspora experts in Kosovo in areas 
like teaching, research, technological or business 
consulting should be encouraged. It is most likely 
that Diaspora members would establish effective 
and lasting working relationships.* While busi-
ness investment by Diaspora members and house-
holds with migrants depends first and foremost on 
the overall investment climate, more resources for 
central and local-level investment promotion and 
support would render these existing policies more 
effective.
Finally, labour migration and mobility in Europe 
would greatly help human development in Kosovo. 
Potential host countries should consider creating 
additional opportunities for labour migrants from 
Kosovo while Kosovo authorities should as a priori-
ty implement the roadmap set by the EU for visa lib-
eralization within the Schengen Area which would 
in turn facilitate international mobility for study, 
work, medical treatment, and leisure.
 
*In this context, it is worth mentioning that the ongoing DEED Project 2 
(2012 to 2014; http://deed-ks.org) by IOM and UNDP in close consulta-
tions with the main stakeholder, the Ministry of Diaspora of Kosovo, aims 
to maximize the potential contribution of migrants and Diaspora members 
to Kosovo’s economic and social development.
Kosovo Human Development Report 2014XVI

CHAPTER 1
19
1. Introduction: How
does migration 
contribute to 
human development?
While human development is about expanding peo-
ple’s choices to reach their full potential and lead 
high-quality lives, human mobility is about expand-
ing people’s freedom to pursue a life plan, achieve 
goals and choose with autonomy.1   
  
The current scale of international migration (or 
human mobility) in the world is striking with mi-
grants accounting for approximately 3 percent of 
the world’s population2  or 232 million people.3 As 
noted by the United Nations Secretary General Ban 
Ki-Moon: “The face of migration is changing. To-
day, migrants are coming from, and going to, more 
places than ever before. Almost half of migrants are 
women. One of every ten migrants is under the age 
of (15) fifteen. And (4) four of every (10) ten mi-
grants are living in developing countries.”4
International discourse on development and mo-
bility recognizes that migration can improve living 
standards and welfare whilst also introducing new 
vulnerabilities and costs for migrants, their families 
and sending communities.5  “In policy circles there 
is increasing consensus that for migration (mobili-
ty) to become an effective tool for development it is 
necessary to design the right complementary pol-
icies and programmes, including those relating to 
social protection in the countries of origin. In a […] 
statement, the UN Secretary General described in-
ternational migration as a positive force for devel-
opment if buttressed by the right policies”.6
A High-level Dialogue on International Migration 
and Development held in 2013, produced an eight 
point action oriented agenda and a target  for “a co-
operative international migration system that is less 
costly and more productive for all stakeholders and 
that conforms to the rule of law and international 
human rights norms”.7 
The Dialogue called on the international communi-
ty to:  i) improve protection of human rights for all 
migrants; ii) lower the costs of migration; iii) end 
the exploitation of migrants including human traf-
ficking; iv) address the plight of stranded migrants; 
v) improve public perceptions of migrants; vi) in-
tegrate migration into the post 2015 development 
agenda in the framework of a new set of goals for 
sustainable development and viii) strengthen the 
migration evidence base, and enhance migration 
partnerships and cooperation.8
The post-2015 process however remains fluid and 
migration-related targets remain a work in progress. 
1.1 Human development, 
mobility and Kosovo
More than a decade after the conflict, Kosovo has 
reached a critical juncture where the desire for a sta-
ble and more prosperous future, in which far-reach-
ing development aspirations are realised, juxtapos-
es with the corrosive impact of decades of neglect, 
mismanagement, and discrimination. 
 
In the aftermath of the 1999 conflict, Kosovo has 
enjoyed an economic recovery.  The growth rate of 
Gross Domestic Product peaked at 5.4 percent in 
2008 and is on the rise again (currently at 4.3 per-
cent), following the 2009  global economic crisis. 
Kosovo’s Human Development Index also enjoyed 
a year on year increase from 2007 to 2012 mostly 
because of higher GDP9 and higher life expectancy 
due to improvements in the health sector.10  Howev-
er, labour market conditions remain difficult with a 
headline unemployment rate at 28.1 percent for men 
and 40.0 percent for women.11   
Throughout its history Kosovo has experienced mi-
gration with profound implications on its develop-
ment. With approximately one third of people born 
in Kosovo thought to be currently residing outside 
its territory there is an urgent need for Kosovo au-
thorities to participate proactively in the internation-
al debate on migration and to develop complemen-
tary policies and programmes on migration and on 
the sustainable human development of Kosovo and 
its citizens.  
The Ministry of Diaspora has already committed 
itself to use the recommendations of this report in 
the development of an Action Plan to implement the 
approved Strategy on Diaspora and Migration 2013-
2018.12  In addition, central and local Government 
bodies have welcomed this report due especially to 
the fact that Kosovo citizens, alone out of all other 
Balkan populations, still do not enjoy visa-free trav-
el within Europe, as requirements reflected in the 
Roadmap13  have not as yet been fulfilled. 
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This report addresses the issue of how migration can 
be managed as a force for development in Kosovo 
through an analysis of mobility/migration and hu-
man development including: demography, econo-
my, gender and social inclusion, education, health 
(-care) and public participation. 
The report draws on the findings of the UNDP Hu-
man Development Report 2009 ‘Overcoming bar-
riers: Human mobility and development‘.14 Main 
data sources include: the Kosovo Remittance Sur-
vey 2011 and 2013,15 the World Bank Migration and 
Economic Development Report 2011,16 the UNDP 
Public Pulse Survey data17 and the Kosovo Census 
conducted in 2011.18
Lack of reliable data on migration is a significant 
challenge and one immediate recommendation is 
for further research on educational attainment and 
especially the professional/occupational profiles of 
emigrants in order to assess the potential of knowl-
edge and skill transfer. Additional and on-going re-
search is also needed on the impact of remittances 
on human development and recipients’ willingness 
to work. A third area of further research is recom-
mended to better understand reasons for limited 
investment by the Kosovan Diaspora and to study 
potential sectors where they might want to invest in 
the future. 
Despite the need for evidence-based policy making 
and research, the impact of remittances on sustain-
able economic and human development in Kosovo 
and the impact of migration on the transfer of skills 
and knowledge by the Kosovan Diaspora to their 
place of origin are noted to be important. 
1.2 Outline of the 2014 
Kosovo Human 
Development Report
Migration and remittances have an impact on hu-
man development because once individuals move 
abroad they expand their life options and by impli-
cation, their level of human development.  In addi-
tion, migrants abroad interact with their family and 
friends at home in ways that support their human 
development, including the sending of remittances. 
To understand the orders of magnitude involved, we 
begin this report by reviewing the history of emi-
gration from Kosovo and by providing an estimate 
of the size of the Diaspora. In this context, we also 
look at current migration flows and migration inten-
tions among current residents (Chapter 2).
 
We also analyse the macroeconomic effect of the 
sheer number of Kosovans living abroad and the 
level of remittances received (Chapter 3) and as-
sess how higher demand for domestically produced 
goods and services has affected unemployment and 
wages over the last decade with a focus on the pos-
sible occurrence of  ‘Dutch disease’.19    
Next we analyse how higher remittances have af-
fected material well-being, poverty, and spending 
on education and health care at the household level 
(Chapter 4). 
We take into account the situation of female mi-
grants and female-headed households both at home 
and abroad, and we consider the elderly left behind 
as one potential vulnerable group (Chapter 5). 
We also look at how remittances affect education at-
tendance and access to health care at the household 
level (Chapters 6 and 7).  
In Chapter 8 we examine the role of international 
mobility in promoting social and political engage-
ment and review Diaspora activities that have taken 
place to date while in Chapter 9 we present possible 
policy interventions that could enhance the benefi-
cial effects of migration and remittances on human 
development in Kosovo and we consider measures 
to involve the Diaspora more effectively. 
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2. Evolving patterns of 
demography, migration, 
and the Kosovan 
Diaspora today 
In addition to directly improving welfare in Koso-
vo, migration also has an impact on human devel-
opment not only through the sending of remittances 
but also through Diaspora expenditure when visiting 
Kosovo, Diaspora investment in Kosovo, transfer of 
skills, participation in social and political affairs, 
and support for the mobility of Kosovo residents 
for education, health care, and employment. The 
level of impact depends on several factors includ-
ing the socio-economic characteristics of migrants, 
their level of integration in the host country, and 
their closeness to family members at home. In this 
Chapter, we analyze the patterns of demography and 
migration in Kosovo and how migration can shape 
the life choices of Kosovans.  We also take a look at 
returnees and their potential contribution to human 
development in Kosovo.
2.1 Demography, waves of 
migration, and the Diaspora 
Emigration is better understood within the broader 
context of Kosovo’s rapid population growth since 
the Second World War and the long-term shifts in 
the relative numbers of ethnic K-Albanians and 
K-Serbs as depicted in Figure 2.1. Although a cen-
sus was conducted in Kosovo approximately once 
every ten years up to 1991, the reliability of some 
of the data is questionable and no consistent infor-
mation is available on migration flows. Given these 
challenges and as can be seen in Box 2.1, the Koso-
vo Agency for Statistics (KAS) has used its own 
methodology to estimate a Diaspora size of just over 
700,000 people. As can be seen in Box 2.1, we have 
calculated both an upper boundary estimate (ap-
proximately 579,000 Kosovo-Albanians, 175,000 
Kosovo-Serbs, and 120,000 individuals with other 
ethnicities) and a lower boundary estimate (approx-
imately 380,000 people) for the size of the Koso-
van Diaspora although a more reasonable estimate 
is thought to be in the region of 700,000 individuals 
which is similar to that estimated by the KAS. As 
can be seen in Figure 2.2,20  the majority of migrants 
documented in the 2011 Census had been abroad 
since 1980. Figure 2.2 (and other data sources) also 
allows us to identify four distinct phases of emigra-
tion from Kosovo including:21   
• Pre 1989: Unskilled young men with little 
education from rural Kosovo emigrated to 
Germany and Switzerland as guest workers 
mainly in the 1960s. During this wave those 
who emigrated sent home money which was 
used for the most part to invest in houses.22 
The flow of migration decreased briefly in 
the 1970s when new jobs were created in the 
public sector and socially-owned enterprises 
in Kosovo. At that stage Kosovo gained au-
tonomous political status within the former 
Yugoslavia and the overall political and eco-
nomic position of K-Albanians improved.  
• 1989 - 1997: Kosovo’s autonomy was abol-
ished and roughly more than 150,000 Albanian 
workers were dismissed from the public ser-
vice and socially-owned enterprises.23 Skilled 
and educated young men from both rural and 
urban areas migrated to Western European 
countries to find jobs and to escape from the 
Yugoslav military service. Migration was seen 
as a means to escape poverty and improve the 
quality of life for family members left behind 
through remittances.24  
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Figure 2.1: Demographic trends, Kosovo, 1948-2011
Source: KAS (2012, p. 16) Population and Housing Census 2011, Final Results. 
People on the Move. Prishtina/Pristina: KAS  
• 1998-1999: More than 800,000 people flee as 
refugees, mostly to Albania, Western Europe 
or the United States of America.25 In the after-
math of the conflict (June 1999), Kosovo ex-
perienced a rapid return of the displaced pop-
ulation. 
• Post 1999: As political stability was estab-
lished in Kosovo, the immigration policies of 
Western European countries became less fa-
vourable for Kosovans. In this period, the em-
igration wave mainly consists of: 1) migration 
for family reunification purposes; 2) irregu-
lar migration of unskilled and undereducated 
youth and 3) (temporary) legal migration of 
highly skilled and highly educated individuals 
through study or work arrangements. 
2.1.1 Socioeconomic 
characterictics: 
educational profile, age, gender 
and place of origin 
As can be seen in Table 2.1, based on the Econom-
ic Development Group Survey conducted in 2009, 
more than 80 percent of emigrants who left Kosovo 
before 1989 had completed primary and secondary 
education (World Bank, 2009 gives an even higher 
figure of 90 percent). The share of emigrants with 
higher education increased significantly, from 18 
percent (1989-1997) to 30 percent (1997-1998). 
The dominance of secondary education among mi-
grants was also reported in the Kosovo Remittance 
Survey  of 2012 however the KRS did not collect 
this information prior to migration and is therefore 
not directly comparable with the 2009 EDG survey. 
Further and more detailed information in relation to 
education and migration is presented in Chapter 6.
Emigration 
waves
Education before migration (in percentage)
Did not 
complete 
primary
Primary 
education
Secondary 
education
University 
education
Pre 1989 0.0 2.7 79.5 17.8
1989-1997 2.6 3.2 64.0 30.2
1998-1999 0.0 3.0 58.2 38.8
Post 1999 0.4 0.4 64.3 35.0
Total 1.3 2.1 65.1 31.5
The average age at the time of migration has re-
mained at around 25 years old (Table 2.2), with men 
emigrating at a later age (26 years) compared to
women (22 years).
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Box 2.1. Estimation of the size of diaspora – Kosovo 
Agency of Statistics Approach
Based on Census data from April 2011 the population of Kosovo was 1,780,645.  KAS estimates that 
by April 2011 approximately 450,000 to 550,000 Kosovans had emigrated (all ethnicities).  Based on 
the rate of population growth and traditional patterns of Kosovan families, KAS has also calculated 
three estimates for the number of children born outside of Kosovo among the emigrant community 
during the period of 1969-2011:
• High estimation – 172,520 children.
• Medium estimation - 153,978 children.
• Low estimation - 112,625 children.
KAS considers the medium estimate as representative of the actual situation which gives a total esti-
mate of 703,978 for the Kosovo Diaspora (1969 until April 2011).   
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Figure 2.2: Flow of migrants, 1980-2010
Table 2.1: Emigrants educational level across 
emigration waves
Source: KAS (2012, p. 16) Population and Housing Census 2011, Final Results. People on the 
Move. Prishtina/Pristina: KAS
Source: EDG Migration survey (2009) 
Figure 2.3: Share of rural and urban 
population:Kosovo residents vs. emigrant 
population (in %)
Table 2.2: Average age of emigrant at the time 
of migration and current time, by gender
Source: KRS (2013)
Migration 
waves
Average age of emigrant 
at the time of migration
Actual average age of 
emigrant
Men Women Men Women
Pre 1989 25 20 52 45
1989-1997 26 20 41 35
1998-1999 27 25 37 36
Post 1999 26 24 33 29
Overall 
average age 
of migrants
26 22 41 36
25 38
Recent surveys suggest that migration remains more 
attractive to younger individuals who have more 
time to realise the benefits.26  
Similar findings can be seen in the KRS 2013 data 
which shows that emigrant household heads are 
11.9 years younger than household heads in Kosovo 
(an average age of 41 years compared to 52.9 years). 
There is clear evidence that strong family ties drive 
migration abroad. Many men who migrate from 
Kosovo marry Kosovan women and for younger 
women in particular, migration is mainly driven by 
marriage.
Recent KRS 2013 data shows a somewhat misbal-
anced gender structure amongst the Diaspora with 
57 percent of emigrants being men and 43.3 per-
cent women; while in Kosovo the gender structure 
among residents is 50.3 percent men and 49.7 per-
cent for women.27 This is further discussed in Chap-
ter 5. 
As can be seen in Figure 2.3, over 60% of the pop-
ulation in Kosovo are rural dwellers while the share 
of those from rural areas among the emigrant popu-
lation exceeds 70% of the total.  
2.1.2 Brain drain vs. brain gain
An important aspect of migration concerning its 
contribution to the home country is the question 
of skilling or deskilling.  Although we do not have 
data on the jobs that migrants held before they left 
(usually used as a proxy for skilled labour), we can 
investigate this issue by comparing the level of 
education of migrants before migration and their 
current occupation. Results from the EDG survey 
as discussed above, show far more pronounced ev-
idence of a skilling, rather than a deskilling process 
among the Kosovan Diaspora. In terms of Kosovo‘s 
human capital, the type of migration that Kosovo 
has experienced so far cannot be considered a brain 
drain. However, given the higher rates of youth un-
employment (aged 15–24) in Kosovo compared to 
the rest of the working age population, a brain drain 
could become a bigger concern in the future when 
unemployed youth might be inclined to leave the 
country.28
2.2 Current migration flows 
This section relies on current demographic patterns, 
as well as inflow and outflow figures, to forecast fu-
ture emigration flows and their consequences for the 
labour market and other areas. 
Recent studies suggest that the rate of migration 
has risen of late. According to the Kosovo Remit-
tance Survey 2012, 43 percent of Kosovo citizens 
have family members who live abroad.  This is an 
increase from 2011 when 37 percent of families in-
terviewed for the KRS reported the same. In 2012, 
22.4 percent of Kosovo families reported that they 
received remittances from their family members. 
Based on the 2011 Census data Kosovo has the 
youngest population in Europe with an average age 
of 29.5 years (in 2010, the average age in the Euro-
pean Union (EU) in 2010 was 40.9 years). This im-
plies that the trend in migration from Kosovo may 
well continue for some time to come.29 While we do 
not have exact figures recent estimates suggest that 
the number of emigrants per year is approximately 
12,000 to 13,000.30   
2.2.1 Asylum seekers
As can be seen in Table 2.3, there was a slight de-
crease in the numbers of Kosovans seeking asylum 
in EU countries between the years 2009 and 2012.31 
During the first half of 2013 however, Eurostat re-
ported a four-fold increase in Kosovan asylum seek-
ers as compared to the same period in 2012.  
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Figure 2.3: Share of rural and urban 
population:Kosovo residents vs. emigrant 
population (in %)
Table 2.2: Average age of emigrant at the time 
of migration and current time, by gender
Source: KRS (2013)
Source: EDG Migration survey (2009)
62%
0%
Rural urban
Kosovo 
Resident
Emigrant
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
73%
38%
27%
Out of this number just 4 percent of the 2460 appli-
cations were successful. The vast majority of asy-
lum applicants were aged between 18 and 34 years 
(Figure 2.4).33 The high rate of unemployment (73 
percent) among Kosovan youth aged 15 to 24 years 
is most likely the reason for the high numbers of 
young people seeking asylum in the EU.34  
The European Asylum Support Office reports that 20 
percent of asylum seekers from Kosovo are Roma, 
Ashkali and Egyptians, 10 percent ethnic Serbs and 
70 percent ethnic Albanians.35 
This information includes only those who have ap-
plied and hence registered for asylum in the EU 
suggesting that the total number could be higher.
The majority of Kosovan asylum applicants are in 
France, Germany and Belgium (Table 2.3). 
K-Albanians comprise the majority of applicants in 
Belgium and France, whereas in Germany and Swit-
zerland, the majority of applicants are Roma, Ash-
kali or/and Egyptians.36 Luxembourg and Switzer-
land, received the majority of K-Serb applications 
most of whom were from Mitrovica and Gjilan/Gn-
jilane. Out of the total number, 59 percent are men 
and only 41 percent are women. The numbers of 
female asylum seekers is low which is explained by 
the fact that K-Albanian men tend to secure asylum, 
regulate their permit stay and then make efforts to 
bring their families over to the host country. 
2.2.2 Migration motives
Since the recent declaration of independence in 
2008, migration from Kosovo has been driven by 
economic reasons (37.9 percent) and to an even 
greater extent for purposes of family reunification 
(48.8 percent) (Figure 2.5). Similarly, Eurostat data 
(Figure 2.6) suggests that the education of children, 
and hopes for a better and safer future also influence 
the decision to leave. 
As indicated in the Table 2.4 a large number of citi-
zens continue to consider migration as the best solu-
tion to their poor economic conditions. In 2012 86% 
of those who were planning to migrate were doing 
so for economic purposes. This is a significant in-
crease from 2011 when just 70% of respondents cit-
ed economic reasons indicative perhaps of the poor 
economic performance of the country. Figure 2.7 
provides a compilation of data on plans to migrate 
including employment status, dwelling place and so 
on. The highest share of those who plan to migrate 
are from Gjilan/ Gnjilane (28%) and Gjakova/ Đa-
kovica (19.6%) regions respectively.   
Figure 2.4: Share of asylum seekers by age group, 
2009-2012
Source: Eurostat 32
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Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total Percent 
share by 
country
N % N % N % N % n
France  4,585 27.3 5,285  31.4  3,240 19.3 3,715 22.1  16,825 33.3 
Belgium 2,505 25.6 3,225 32.9   2,325  23.7 1,745 17.8  9,800 19.4
Germany 1,910 22.4 2,200 25.8  1,890 22.1 2,535 29.7   8,535 16.9 
Sweden 1,225 23.1 1,715 32.4  1,315 24.8 1,045 19.7 5,300 10.5 
Hungary 1,795 68.9 380 14.6 210 8.1 220  8.4  2,605 5.2 
Austria 1,295 50.5 605  23.6 350 13.6 315 12.3 2,565 5.1 
Switzerland 690 50.9 -   -   665 49.1  -    -     1,355 2.7 
Italy 295 36.2 300 36.8 110 13.5 110 13.5 815 1.6 
Luxembourg 140 20.9 170  25.4 150 22.4 210 31.3 670 1.3 
Norway -    -     240 45.3 155 29.2 135 25.5  530 1.1 
Other 485 33.3 380 26.1 285 19.6  305 21.0 1,455 2.9 
Total 14,925 29.6 14,500 28.7 10,695 21.2 10,335 20.5 50,455 100.0 
Table 2.3: Kosovan Asylum seekers in EU and 
Schengen Zones, 2009-2012  
Source: Eurostat (2012)
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Figure 2.5: Main reasons for migration (in %)
Figure 2.7: Share of respondents with migration plans by ethnicity, employment status, place of 
residence, region and remittances receipt in 2012 and 2011 (in %)
Figure 2.6: Emigration motives of Kosovan 
asylum seekers in EU member states, 2008-2012
Source: Kosovo Census 2011 (REKOS 2011)
Source: Eurostat (2012)
2.2.3 Migration intentions
Our review of the history of migration from Kosovo 
(Section 2.1) and our analysis of current migration 
flows (Section 2.2) have identified “push” as well 
as “pull” factors as important drivers of migration. 
While this distinction may be more intuitive than 
analytically rigorous, it is clear that political and so-
cio-economic events in the 1990s “pushed” many 
to leave Kosovo. Analysis of data from the Kosovo 
Public Pulse (October 2012) finds that the intention 
to migrate does not vary much across education 
levels, although it is a little higher for those with 
advanced tertiary education (older than 17 years). 
More women than men in the over 17 years old age 
bracket indicated an intention to migrate. Divorced 
women reported a higher intention to migrate than 
other demographical groups. In addition, women 
with either a basic or less then basic level of edu-
cation and those with a more advanced education 
level were found to be more likely to plan to migrate 
than men with these levels of education. The sur-
vey also found that the intention to migrate varies 
substantially with employment status. As might be 
expected, many unemployed or occasionally em-
ployed individuals intend to migrate (51 percent and 
Table 2.4: Plans and reasons for migration, (in %)
Source: UNDP - KRS (2011, 2012)
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Figure 2.5: Main reasons for migration (in %)
Figure 2.7: Share of respondents with migration plans by ethnicity, employment status, place of 
residence, region and remittances receipt in 2012 and 2011 (in %)
Figure 2.6: Emigration motives of Kosovan 
asylum seekers in EU member states, 2008-2012
Source: Kosovo Census 2011 (REKOS 2011)
Source: Eurostat (2012)
Source: KRS (2011 and 2012), UNDP Survey Data
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 areas
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14.90%
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18.60%
20.20%
16.50%
13%
24.80%
20%
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11.80%
19.90%
18%
15.80%
14.90%
5.30%
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13%
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13.80%
12.80%
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8.20%
0%
19.60%
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 Remittances
 status
Year Households 
with 
migration 
plans 
(percent)
Economic 
reasons
Family 
reunification
Schooling
KRS 2011 15% 70% 10% 2%
KRS 2012 16% 86% 3% 2%
40 percent, respectively). More surprisingly howev-
er is that those who work in the private sector (38 
percent) intend to migrate versus only 17 percent of 
those who work in the public sector.37 Migration in-
tention also varies with the satisfaction levels about 
Kosovo’s political status. As shown in Figure 2.8, 
in a recent opinion poll 44 percent of respondents 
who reported themselves to be “very dissatisfied” 
with the political direction of Kosovo claimed to be 
planning to migrate.
2.2.4 Current location 
The majority of the Diaspora community live in 
Germany and Switzerland, followed by Slovenia, 
Italy, Austria and the United States.38 Figure 2.9 
provides average figures on geographic dispersion 
derived from a number of surveys conducted over 
the past three years.39 
2.3 Return migration 
The vast majority of migrants are employed (Figure 
2.10). Of those who currently plan to return home 
54.6 percent hold managerial positions and work in 
professional jobs (Figure 2.11). Returned migrants 
tend to work in more highly skilled jobs than current 
migrants (Figure 2.12).40   
Skilled returning migrants are likely to enhance the 
stock of human capital and human development in 
Kosovo.  Studies have found that migrants tend to 
accumulate capital, knowledge and skills and then 
return home. The 2011 Census data shows that re-
turnees are considerably more skilled than the resi-
dent population. 
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Figure 2.8: Intentions to migrate based on 
country’s direction
Figure 2.10: Employment status of migrants 
household heads
Figure 2.11: Plans for return by skill levels 
of migrants
Figure 2.9: Distribution of emigrants by country 
Public Pulse Database 2012
Source: KRS, 2012, UNDP Survey Data
Source: KRS, 2011 and 2012, UNDP Survey Data
Skilled migrants include professional and qualified jobs and managerial positions 
while unskilled include unqualified jobs. The category “plan to return” includes 
people who stated that they will return to Kosovo while the category “do not plan to 
return” include people who answered no and those who were not sure.
Source: EDG Survey with migrants, 2009. Authors own calculations 
0%
G
er
m
a
n
y
Sw
it
z
er
la
n
d
It
a
ly
Sl
o
v
en
ia
A
u
st
r
ia
U
SA
Sw
ed
en
 
Fr
a
n
c
e
U
K
Be
lg
iu
m
N
o
rw
ay
5%
10%
15%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
32.80%
24.80% 
7.60%    6.10%    5.90%   4.30%    2.90%   2.90%    2.50%    2.20%    1.50%
Kosovo Human Development Report 201428
0%
Employed Unemployed Others
2011
2012
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
93.80%   87%
4.30%   3% 1.90%  10%
0%
Unskilled migrants   Skilled migrants           total
2011
2012
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
31%
54.60%
48%
plan to return
Figure 2.12: Employment Rate for Returned
Migrants
Unfortunately, the high unemployment rate in 
Kosovo, could mean that the labour market may not 
be able to absorb all returnees although of late the 
private sector has claimed that the lack of skilled 
labour poses severe problems for the development 
of businesses, in particular for high level jobs.41 The 
absorption rate of the labour market is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 3.
More recently, a 2011 study on students’ intentions 
to migrate conducted with pre final and final year 
university students in Albania, Kosovo, and the For-
mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia shows that 50 
percent of those who planned to migrate from Koso-
vo considered three main reasons: education, work, 
and living abroad. 
Their willingness to return to Kosovo is promis-
ing, with 51 percent of those interviewed preferring 
to return immediately after finishing their studies. 
These findings suggest a need for policy measures to 
attract highly educated Kosovo migrants to return. 
2.3.1 Voluntary and forced return
According to the International Organisation for Mi-
gration (IOM), a total of 200,591 migrants were as-
sisted in returning home from June 1999 to Decem-
ber 2012. The largest number of voluntary returnees 
came from Germany, constituting 42.4 percent 
(85,047) whereas those from Switzerland represent-
ed 17.3 percent (34,653). Based on these figures, it 
can be assumed that an average of 4,000 to 5,000 
people per year return to Kosovo.42 The number of 
forced returns is much higher than voluntary returns
(Figure 2.13). From the total number of returnees, 
70 percent were deported or forced to return indi-
cating a low level of willingness to return which is 
somewhat different than what is borne out in other 
data and opinion polls. Available data shows that the 
majority of those returning belong to the 18-34 age 
group (Figure 2.14).
Figure 2.13: Voluntary and forced readmitted 
persons, 2005-2012
Figure 2.12: Employment Rate for Returned
Migrants
Figure 2.14: Voluntary and forced readmitted 
persons by age group (in %), 2012
Source: Border Police Data, in Ministry of Internal Affairs (2013). Extended Migration 
Profile. Department of Citizenship, Asylum and Migration - Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Source: Migration Survey 2009 (World Bank 2010).
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs (2013). Extended Migration Profile. Department of 
Citizenship, Asylum and Migration - Ministry of Internal Affairs
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Key points – Chapter 2
• Migration from Kosovo has occurred in four waves since the late 1960s. Initially, mostly young 
men sought better employment opportunities abroad. From 1989, the worsening political climate 
and growing unemployment among Kosovo-Albanians caused a larger exodus, mainly to Swit-
zerland and Germany. During the 1998/1999 war, many individuals sought refuge in neighboring 
countries and across Western Europe; a large share of these refugees returned to Kosovo after 
conditions stabilised. Since 2000, there has been a steady outflow of migrants in response to high 
unemployment and the lack of economic opportunities in Kosovo.
• Migration and links with the Diaspora are pervasive in Kosovo. Approximately 40 percent of Koso-
vo residents have family members abroad, while one in four families receives remittances.
• The share of emigrants with higher education increased significantly from the 1970s to the 1990s; 
emigrant household heads now have a slightly higher education level than those in Kosovo. The 
Diaspora is younger on average than Kosovo residents; emigrant household heads are on average 
41 years old vs. 53 years for Kosovo residents.
• Many emigrants continue their education abroad or acquire relevant skills by working in qualified 
jobs. Those emigrants who plan to return tend to be higher-skilled than those who do not, suggest-
ing possible benefits for Kosovo.
• During the first half of 2013, only 4 percent of 2460 decisions on asylum seekers from Kosovo in 
the EU were successful. The high rejection rate and subsequent return of applicants present import-
ant challenges for Kosovo authorities and for the visa liberalisation process with the EU. Asylum 
applications and subsequent return render it difficult to assess current net migration flow in Kosovo.
• Among the motives for migration, family reunification currently predominates, largely because it 
represents one of the few legal opportunities for emigration currently available to Kosovo residents. 
For many such emigrants, the underlying motive remains employment abroad because family unifi-
cation often depends on the previous emigration of a family member for entirely economic reasons.
 
• Opinion surveys suggest that approximately half the individuals between 18 and 36 years (and 
more than one third of all respondents) plan to migrate. The main reason is the unfavourable eco-
nomic situation of the respondent’s family (81 percent). Migration intention is especially wide-
spread among unemployed or occasionally employed individuals (51 percent and 40 percent, re-
spectively). Of those who work in the private sector, fully 38 percent intend to migrate versus only 
17 percent of those in the public sector. Migration intention does not vary much across education 
levels, although it is a little higher for those with advanced tertiary education (age group older than 
17 years).

CHAPTER 3
Table 3.1: Key macroeconomic indicators 
(2004-2012)
3. Migration,
remittances, and 
economic 
development in Kosovo
Diaspora-related financial transactions include re-
mittances, travel expenditure when visiting Kosovo 
and international investment conducted or facili-
tated by Diaspora members. Given the size of the 
Diaspora population in comparison to the resident 
population in Kosovo (approximately 700,000 / 1.8 
million) the economic impact of these transactions 
is large in relation to Kosovo’s domestic output and 
very prominent in Kosovo’s international reserve 
inflows.43 Personal remittances alone amounted to 
17 percent of GDP in 2012, making Kosovo one of 
the top 15 recipients of remittances worldwide, rela-
tive to the size of the domestic economy.44  
Remittances strengthen demand for imported and 
domestically produced goods and services, raising 
prices and ultimately wages throughout the Koso-
van economy thereby contributing to Kosovo’s 
transition from post-conflict economic recovery to 
investment-driven and inclusive growth, which is a 
precondition for human development.
In this Chapter, we discuss the macroeconomic role 
of remittances and other Diaspora-related reserve 
inflows and their impact on human development 
in Kosovo, We begin by reviewing key macroeco-
nomic indicators (Section 3.1) and then discuss the 
evolution of the main Diaspora-related internation-
al reserve inflows (Section 3.2). Against this back-
ground, we analyse the macroeconomic effects of 
the inflows (Section 3.3).
3.1 Key macroeconomic 
indicators 
Since the mid-2000s, GDP in Kosovo has grown at 
an average rate of 3 to 4 percent per year (Table 3.1). 
Remittances have played a major role in that growth 
and have to a certain degree compensated for Koso-
vo’s lack of export income.45  
Despite year on year growth of GDP the Kosovan 
economy has not created enough jobs to reduce un-
employment, especially among young people (15-
24 years) who experience rates as high as 70%.46 
Average unemployment remained at approximately 
44 percent during 2004 to 2009 and while the cur-
rent estimate of unemployment is somewhat lower 
at 35 percent, this is due primarily to methodolog-
ical changes in the way the figure is calculated and 
there are no indications that unemployment has ac-
tually declined.47 The related risks of poverty and 
social exclusion that stem from wide-spread unem-
ployment (especially among the youth) are major 
threats to Kosovo’s future.
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Indicator 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP (million EUR) 2912 3003 3120 3461 3940 4008 4291 4776 4916.4
GDP per capita (EUR) 1813 1834 1875 2046 2291 2293 2418 2650 2721
GDP real growth rate (percent) 3.4% 8.9% 7.2% 3.5% 3.2% 4.4% 2.5%
Consumtpion 110.3% 112.1% 111.1% 110.3% 110.3% 107.3% 106.2% 105.2% 106.9%
Investment 24.1% 24.1% 25.6% 25.9% 27.8% 29.0% 31.3% 32.1% 31.4%
Gross fixed capital formation 20.0% 19.7% 21.1% 21.5% 23.8% 25.6% 27.8% 28.8% 28.2%
Net exports -34.4% -36.2% -36.7% -35.9% -38.0% -36.4% -37.5% -37.2% -35.1%
Current account balance -7.2% -8.2% -7.2% -6.2% -11.7% -9.3% -12.0% -13.8% -7.7%
Remittances, gross inflows* 12.3% 13.9% 15.0% 14.9% 15.4% 14.6% 13.6% 12.2% 19.4%
Government transfers, gross inflows 12.8% 11.6% 10.3% 7.1% 5.7% 8.1% 7.4% 6.7% 8.2%
Inwards net FDI inflows 1.5% 3.6% 9.4% 12.7% 9.3% 7.3% 8.5% 8.3% 4.7%
Net errors and ommissions 4.4% 5.8% 7.7% 5.9% 4.1% 4.0% 5.1% 5.0% 4.9%
Table 3.1: Key macroeconomic indicators 
(2004-2012)
Source: KAS (2013a) and CBK (2013a).
Note: In this table remittances include workers’ remittances and employee compensation
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Indicator 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Current Account -208 -247 -226 -214 -461 -374 -516 -658 -380
Goods and services -1001 -1087 -1144 -1242 -1498 -1419 -1565 -1793 -1727
Goods  -983 -1079 -1173 -1353 -1650 -1652 -1752 -2059 -2073
Services -18 -8 29 111 152 232 187 266 346
Travel 27 37 57 97 125 196 222 236 309
Income 138 139 159 186 164 62 67 114 154
Compensation of employees 142 145 147 155 175 169 172 208 214
Investment income -4 -6 12 31 -11 -107 -105 -94 -60
Current transfers 655 700 759 842 873 983 982 1021 1192
Central government 372 348 320 245 224 323 320 322 402
Other sectors 283 352 439 597 650 660 663 699 791
Workers’ remittances 219 289 372 519 523 475 493 489 519
Other transfers 64 64 67 78 127 185 170 179 274
Capital and Financial account 79 73 -15 11 299 213 297 420 140
Capital account 22 19 21 17 10 100 21 42 13
Financial account 58 54 -36 -6 288 113 276 378 127
Direct investment 43 108 289 431 342 281 331 379 216
Portfolio investment -32 -18 -65 -34 -110 -124 -49 -57 -185
Other investment -66 -69 -182 -108 75 -138 47 -6 363
Reserve assets 113 32 -78 -294 -18 95 -53 61 -267
Net errors and ommissions 129 175 241 203 162 160 218 240 239
Imports of goods and services have consistently ex-
ceeded exports in Kosovo. The large trade deficit (€ 
2073 million; Table 3.2)48 was compensated for by a 
surplus in the services trade (including travel expen-
diture by Diaspora members visiting Kosovo) of € 
346 million; a surplus in the income account, large-
ly due to compensation of employees (i.e. resident 
employees working for non-resident employers) at 
€ 214 million; workers’ remittances at € 519 mil-
lion; transfers to the government at € 402 million 
and “other transfers” (including to NGOs) at € 274 
million;  foreign direct investment at € 216 million 
and “errors and omission”, or essentially unac-
counted international reserve inflows which typical-
ly include transfers from migrants in cash or in kind, 
at € 239 million (UNDP, 2012; World Bank 2010a). 
In the following Section we take a closer look at the 
evolution of the most important of these inflows. 
3.2 Diaspora-related 
international reserve 
inflows
3.2.1 Workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees
The term “workers’ remittances” refers to transfers 
from members of the Kosovan Diaspora who are 
employed in other economies and are considered 
residents of their host countries, i.e. they have lived 
abroad for more than one year. By contrast, com-
pensation of employees includes income from tech-
nically non-resident employers in Kosovo as well as 
income from temporary employment abroad. This 
includes everything  from KFOR salaries to salaries 
of civilian employees. Gross inflows of workers’ re-
mittances increased gradually from € 357 million in 
2004 to € 609 million in 2008 and have more or less 
remained at that level.49 Compensation of employ-
ees increased from € 143 million in 2004 to € 220 
million in 2012.50  
Migrant remittances have therefore been a stable 
source of external financing in comparison to many 
items in the financial accounts including Foreign 
Direct Investment. As can be seen in Figure 3.2, 
Kosovan migrant remittances have been remarkably 
resilient in the face of the recent financial crisis.  For 
the most part this can be attributed to the fact that the 
majority of Kosovan migrants are located in Germa-
ny and Switzerland which were much less affected 
by the financial crisis than, for example, Greece and 
Italy where many Albanian migrants reside. 
The rate of remittances may however see a decline 
over the medium to long term as evidence from fo-
cus group discussions in Switzerland suggests that 
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Table 3.2: Net external financial flows, 2004-2012 (million EUR)
Source: CBK (2013)
Figure 3.2: Remittance trends in Kosovo and the 
region (in current USD)*
many Diaspora families are becoming increasingly 
preoccupied with integration in their host countries, 
including their children’s education and purchase of 
real estate.51 This issue is discussed further in Chap-
ter 8. Studies have shown that normally remittances 
peak around 10-11 years after migration, after which 
they gradually start to decrease.52  
3.2.2 Travel expenditures by visitors 
to Kosovo
Kosovo enjoys significant Diaspora tourism particu-
larly during the winter and summer holidays. Gross 
reserve inflows from travel services have increased 
steadily since the early 2000s reaching € 382 mil-
lion in 201253 all at a time when the number of visits 
to Kosovo from international agencies (including 
NGOs, the UN, etc.) declined. There are very few 
other visitors to Kosovo so a significant, if not dom-
inant, proportion of this income can be attributed to 
the Diaspora. 
According to a study conducted by UNDP in 2012, 
more than 90 percent of Kosovan emigrants who 
were interviewed visit once or more a year and stay 
for periods of between two weeks and one month.54 
Their average expenditure while in Kosovo (per re-
spondent) was € 2,352, only slightly below Koso-
vo’s 2012 per-capita GDP.55 In the medium to long 
term, the frequency of Diaspora visits to Kosovo 
will depend on how their ties with friends and fam-
ily in Kosovo evolve, along with their emotional 
attachment to the country. Government policies to 
strengthen links with the Diaspora (Section 9) may 
help in this regard.
3.2.3 Foreign Direct Investment
The high interest rates in Kosovo coupled with the 
negative rate of domestic saving means that Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) is very important in order 
to finance capital investment and increase exports.56 
The level of FDI in Kosovo fluctuated widely from € 
108 million to € 431 million annually between 2005 
and 2012 corresponding to between 3.6 and 12.7 
percent of GDP.57 A large chunk of this was related 
to the privatisation process of formerly state-owned 
companies in mining and other industries.  
During 2011 and 2012, real estate and construction 
accounted for more than one half of total FDI in 
Kosovo (Figure 3.3) and the role of the Disapora in 
this deserves special attention.
Foreign Direct Investment in real estate has grown 
steadily since the mid-2000s, similar to remittances, 
while other types of FDI have been more volatile 
(Figure 3.3). This suggests that FDI in real estate and 
construction is not only driven by short-term com-
mercial considerations, but also, in part, by the long 
term considerations that members of the Diaspora 
typically apply as they determine their personal and 
economic links to Kosovo. However, the contribu-
tion of the Diaspora to investment and private sector 
development can take many forms and is not limit-
ed to real estate and construction. Although official 
data does not allow a distinction between Diaspora 
and other foreign investors, their involvement either 
as direct investors or as facilitators of investment is 
believed to be significant and is estimated to have 
accounted for approximately 30 percent of FDI in 
the privatisation process of the socially owned en-
terprises.58
MIGRATION AS A FORCE FOR DEVELOPMENT 35
Region 
Kosovo 
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1000
U
S 
d
o
ll
a
r
s
U
S 
d
o
ll
a
r
s
2000
3000 Bosna and 
Herzegovina
Albania 
Kosovo
Figure 3.2: Remittance trends in Kosovo and the 
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Figure 3.3: A comparison of FDI inflows in 
construction and real estate to total FDI and 
remittances (million EUR)
*Personal remittances reported by WDI comprise of personal transfers and compensation 
of employees. Personal transfers are not limited to worker remittances as reported in the 
Kosovan BOP (in Table 3.2) because they include all receipts of Kosovan individuals from 
non-resident individuals, regardless of the source of income of the sender (i.e. not only in-
come from labour, but also, e.g. entrepreneurial or property income, social benefits, etc.).
Source: World Bank (2013c) and World Bank Database
Source: CBK (2013)
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Further and similar to foreign investors in gener-
al, Diaspora members bring with them more than 
mere capital. They bring business ideas, technolo-
gy, managerial know-how and increase the skills of 
the workforce and the competitiveness of Kosovan 
products.59 Although these benefits are difficult to 
quantify, successful Kosovan companies where Di-
aspora members have contributed with investment 
and/or management and technological know-how, 
such as Rugova Cheese, Kosovatex, Trofta, 3CIS, 
etc., prove that Kosovo’s private sector is already 
benefiting from its Diaspora. Another notable joint 
initiative of  Diaspora businesses in Kosovo and 
international donors is the EYE Venture, a project 
which combines venture capital, training and men-
toring for start-ups with high growth potential (EYE 
Venture, 2014). 
However, Diaspora members currently spend a rela-
tively small part of their income and remittances on 
business investment. Research suggests that barriers 
to investment in Kosovo tend not to be Diaspora-spe-
cific.60 Rather, investment in general is hampered by 
limited access to finance, corruption, administrative 
inefficiencies and unsatisfactory workforce skills 
among others. One Diaspora-specific barrier how-
ever seems to be their limited access to information 
on potentially profitable investment opportunities as 
suggested by survey data from UNDP in 2012 and 
qualitative data from focus groups with the Diaspo-
ra.61 A second factor, appears to be the perception 
that there is lack of appreciation of the Diaspora 
by the Kosovan institutions, as well as a perceived 
lack of commitment to integrate the Diaspora into 
political activities in Kosovo.62  The Kosovan Gov-
ernment, and particularly the Ministry of Diaspora, 
can take action to promote closer ties with Diaspora 
which would – at least to a certain extent – improve 
a willingness to invest in Kosovo.63  
3.3 Macroeconomic effects 
of remittances and other 
diaspora-related flows
3.3.1 Structural change towards 
non-tradable goods and services 
(“Dutch disease”)
One common feature of workers’ remittances re-
gardless of their origin is that they tend to lead to 
higher demand for local (“non-tradable”) goods 
and services produced in Kosovo. Higher demand 
leads to higher supply of local goods and services. 
Supply is increased firstly through the more effec-
tive use of existing resources and productive ca-
pacity (i.e., underutilized plants and equipment, 
underemployed but suitably trained workers) which 
will not draw factors of production away from other 
(tradable goods) sectors. If, on the other hand, exist-
ing productive capacity is more or less fully utilised, 
higher demand for non-tradable goods and services 
will increase prices which will in turn render these 
sectors more profitable and draw factors of produc-
tion from elsewhere in the economy. 
A higher price of non-tradable goods and services 
relative to tradable ones is equivalent to a real appre-
ciation of the domestic currency so domestic goods 
become more expensive relative to goods from 
the rest of the world.  As a result, export and im-
port-competing industries become less competitive. 
This process occurred in the Netherlands during the 
1950s after they began to export large quantities of 
natural gas. Export revenues were spent not only 
on additional imports but also on non-tradable, do-
mestically produced goods and services, leading to 
a decline in tradable goods industries. The process 
is called “Dutch Disease” by some observers be-
cause human capital formation, which is regarded 
as a precondition for long-term economic growth, 
is assumed to occur in the manufacturing industry 
(tradable goods), rather than in non-tradable ser-
vices sectors (trade, restaurants, government).
It would be natural therefore to look for evidence 
of structural change towards non-tradable sectors 
in the evolution of GDP in Kosovo. Unfortunate-
ly, available data does not render a clear picture 
in this regard.64 Some non-tradable sectors such as 
wholesale and retail, financial intermediation, and 
the Kosovo government (not including donors) saw 
their shares in GDP increase, but so did agriculture 
and manufacturing (both tradable sectors). Turning 
to the relative price of non-tradables vs. tradables 
as approximated by the real effective exchange rate 
(Figure 3.4), there was only a modest real appre-
ciation of about 10 percent between end-2006 and 
end-2010 but little change thereafter.65 
As noted by Korovilas and Havolli (2009) the price 
level in Kosovo (where prices are denominated in 
Euro) is high relative to other Southeast European 
countries. They argue that this is due to remittances 
and related inflows which have in turn prevented the 
re-industrialization of Kosovo that should have oc-
curred along with post-conflict reconstruction. 
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Figure 3.4: Real effective exchange rate 
towards CEFTA and the EU (January 2007=100)
Computer simulations that have been used to anal-
yse the impact of migration and remittances for 
transition countries in Eastern Europe, the Cauca-
sus, and Central Asia suggest that particularly for 
small countries with high remittances relative to 
GDP66  remittances lead to higher private consump-
tion, GDP growth, a higher wage level, and a real 
appreciation of the domestic currency.67 While it is 
plausible that a consistently high rate of remittanc-
es can slow the growth of manufacturing, there are 
additional factors to consider. Re-industrialization 
requires private investment which is currently held 
back by the difficult investment environment in 
Kosovo and the low quality of public infrastructure 
and while these factors might be overcome in time, 
Kosovo’s landlocked geographic location and diffi-
cult relations with Serbia will continue to render the 
integration of production facilities into global pro-
duction networks difficult. 
Given the fact that remittances are spent on imported 
goods they must be having a positive effect on rev-
enue collection.68 To the extent that this assumption 
holds, it would appear that remittances have helped 
finance high public investment rates (by regional 
standards) while increasing government support to 
vulnerable groups in recent years,69 coupled with an 
increase of almost 40 percent in government funds 
spent on social welfare payments in 2011 (compared 
to 2009). 
3.3.2 Effects on the labour market
At the macroeconomic level, migration and remit-
tances contribute to human development by helping 
to stabilise employment and by sustaining higher 
wage levels than would be possible otherwise. 
The World Bank finds that overall Kosovan wages 
are competitive within in the region; levels are rela-
tively low and wage increases have been less rapid 
than elsewhere.70 Wage competitiveness is partic-
ularly strong in tradable sectors and for unskilled 
labour suggesting that Kosovo is not afflicted by a 
“Dutch disease” as discussed above. 
At the same time, the labour market in Kosovo is 
characterised by persistent levels of high unemploy-
ment and economic inactivity. It has been reported 
many people are no longer looking for work because 
the chances of finding a sufficiently well-paid job are 
so low. The best measure of the lack of employment 
opportunities is the low employment ratio (employ-
ment relative to the working age population) which 
declined from 29 percent in the mid-2000s to less 
than 26 percent in 2012.71 As can be seen in Table 
3.3 labour market conditions are particularly harsh 
for women and for the youth.  
Indicator Men Women Total
Labour force participation 55.4% 17.8% 36.9%
Unemployment rate 28.1% 40.0% 30.9%
Employment rate 39.9% 10.7% 25.6%
Youth unemployment rate (15–24) 52.0% 63.8% 55.3%
Low demand for labour is the main reason for the 
lack of employment opportunities. However, gender 
differences in terms of both unemployment and in-
activity are caused at least partly by a lower level 
of education among women and social norms where 
women tend to be the main caregivers.73 Around 
40 percent of women that are unemployed and not 
looking for work report that they are inactive be-
cause they have caregiving responsibilities or per-
sonal/family responsibilities.74
One reason for the persistently low employment rate 
is the high number of new entrants into the labour 
market every year (approximately 36,000 individ-
uals), combined with relatively few retirees (ap-
proximately 10,000).75  With annual emigration in 
the order of 13,000 individuals and only a few thou-
sand returnees (Chapter 2), it is clear that migration 
plays a significant role in reducing the labour supply 
in Kosovo and thereby sustaining the wage level. 
While difficult to quantify, it is clear that by absorb-
ing approximately one out of two new entrants into 
the labour market every year, emigration plays an 
important role in preventing unemployment from 
rising even higher. 
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Figure 3.4: Real effective exchange rate 
towards CEFTA and the EU (January 2007=100)
Source: CBK (2013c)
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Table 3.3: Labour market indicators according 
to gender (2012)
Source: KAS (2013)72
The average wage level in Kosovo even though it 
has remained competitive in the region as noted 
above, has approximately doubled in nominal Euro 
terms since 2003 (Figure 3.5). It is difficult to see 
how this rapid increase could have occurred with-
out growing demand for non-tradable, domestically 
produced goods and services due to migrant remit-
tances and other Diaspora-related international re-
serve inflows (Section 3.3.1). 
In particular, there is little evidence of a wide-spread, 
rapid growth in labour productivity that might oth-
erwise explain the wage increase, especially since 
2006. Rather, available evidence suggests that pro-
ductivity growth was too small to explain the large 
wage increase, pointing instead to the role of higher 
demand for non-tradable, domestic goods and ser-
vices. Migration can also help address the insuffi-
cient level and quality of skills among the Kosovan 
workforce. There are regular reports that companies 
in Kosovo experience problems recruiting work-
ers with the right skills and at times even express 
concerns about the actual skills of highly educated 
workers.76 As noted in Chapter 2 and Chapter 6 of 
this report migrants tend to acquire formal training 
and work experience abroad while remittances help 
to pay for the education of family members at home. 
Migrants also report that their experience abroad has 
improved their prospects of finding a job in Kosovo 
and they tend to enjoy a higher employment rate and 
higher wages than non-migrants.77   
The impact of remittances on education spending at 
the household level is discussed further in Chapter 
4 while the impact of migration and remittances on 
education attendance is discussed in Chapter 6.
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Figure 3.5: Average monthly paid net wages, budget sector (€)
Source: MLSW (2013)
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Key points – Chapter 3
• The Diaspora plays an important role in financing the large deficit in merchandise trade, not only 
through remittances as narrowly defined in the balance of payments, but also through compensation 
of employees (i.e. income of Kosovan residents temporarily working abroad), Diaspora tourism, 
and FDI undertaken or facilitated by Diaspora members. Therefore, migration-related inflows are 
an important factor in enabling the country’s domestic absorption (consumption plus investment) 
to exceed domestic output.
• Notwithstanding the resilience of remittances to date, the amount of remittances and Diaspora 
investment could decrease in the medium to long term if the ties of migrants to Kosovo were to 
become weaker over time and new flows of emigration were to be reduced. 
• At the macroeconomic level, migration and remittances have probably contributed to human de-
velopment by helping to increase (or stabilise) employment and by sustaining wages at a higher 
level than they could attain otherwise, therefore reducing income poverty. There are at least two 
channels through which this is likely to happen in Kosovo: First, emigration reduces the domestic 
labour supply and unemployment and, hence, downward pressure on the wage level. Second, remit-
tances and other migration-related flows increase demand for labour for non-tradable domestically 
produced goods and services (wholesale and retail trade sectors, construction industry, healthcare, 
education, and travel related services).
• The Kosovo Diaspora can be a valuable source of investment, particularly in – but not limited to 
– economic activities where Diaspora members are employed in their host countries, such as con-
struction, hotels and restaurants, and manufacturing, but not necessarily limited to these sectors. 
However, the main barriers to Diaspora investment are generic: corruption, inefficient administra-
tion, etc. Lack of information on investment opportunities and some Diaspora members’ perception 
of not being appreciated by Kosovan institutions may constitute further barriers. 
• While initiatives of the Kosovo Government, with donor support, to strengthen ties with the Dias-
pora and to facilitate Diaspora investment are potentially valuable, their full benefits can only be 
reaped when the generic barriers to investment are addressed.
CHAPTER 4
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4. Incidence and use of 
remittances: 
Effects on welfare, 
human development
and employment 
opportunities through 
investment 
In Chapter 3, we have shown that migration and 
remittances, along with other Diaspora-related in-
ternational reserve inflows, have contributed to the 
rapid growth of the average wage and rapidly grow-
ing tax revenues over the last ten years. In this sense, 
all households in Kosovo have indirectly benefitted 
from migration and remmittances. In this Chapter, 
we turn to the direct effects of migration and remit-
tances at the household level which is where we can 
best determine their effect on human development. 
In order to do this, we analyse the incidence and 
value of remittances (Section 4.1), the demographic 
and labour market characteristics of both remittance 
receiving and non-remittance receiving households 
(Section 4.2) followed by an analysis of the impact 
of remittances on household incomes and poverty 
and on household spending for basic needs and hu-
man capital formation (Section 4.3). In Chapter 6 
and 7, we analyse changes in access to education 
and health care.
4.1 Incidence and value of 
remittances according to area of 
residence and ethnic groups
Migrant remittances in Kosovo act as a safety net by 
providing livelihood support to a significant share 
of households and at the same time they help relieve 
pressure on the government budget by replacing 
social benefits. It is estimated that approximately 
25 percent of Kosovan households receive remit-
tances.78 As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the share of 
households relying on remittances from abroad fol-
lowed by an increasing trend until 2007 after which 
it fluctuates between 9 and 10 percent; 2009 is the 
only year that saw a decrease which was most likely 
result of the financial crisis.79  The share of house-
holds relying on internal remittances, although sig-
nificantly lower (ranging between 0 and 2 percent), 
seems to broadly follow the same trend at least until 
2010. 
A look at the trends in Figure 4.1 suggests that the 
share of households relying on remittances from 
abroad and those relying on social benefits seem to 
be negatively correlated, suggesting that remittanc-
es represent an important source of income for some 
of the poorest households in Kosovo, replacing and/
or complementing social benefits.
Characteristics Remittance
recepients
Non remit-
tance
recepients
Household members (average) 4.8 4.7
Share of children* 14.6% 18.6%
Share of elderly* 0.1% 4.7%
Share of women - headed 
households* 
12.5% 16.9%
Share living in rural areas* 52.8% 49.1%
Share living in Prishtina* 18.2% 24.7%
An initial comparison between remittance receiv-
ing and non-receiving households does not reveal 
major differences in terms of size, composition and 
location of residence. Households that receive re-
mittances, on average, have a larger share of elderly 
people (i.e. above the age of 65 years), but a smaller 
share of children. This is consistent with the fact that 
emigrants are for the most part of working age and 
that many have established their nuclear families 
in the host countries and are continuing to support 
their parents (and siblings) in Kosovo. Accordingly, 
Kosovan households most frequently report having 
a ‘child’ (41 percent of households) and ‘brother’ 
(29 percent of households) abroad. Those reporting 
a sister abroad accounted for 8 percent of house-
holds. There are some differences between different 
ethnic groups in this respect, as discussed later in 
this section. Female-headed households are some-
what over-represented among remittance recipients 
compared to the rest of the population.80 
Figure 4.1: Share of households according to 
their main source of income (%)
Table 4.1: Mean household characteristics 
Source: Kosovo agency of statistics: Kosovo Remittances Survey (2013)
*The asterisk denotes differences which are statistically significant at 5%
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from (UNDP, 2011) 
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Remittance recipient households are also more like-
ly to reside in rural areas and less likely to reside 
in the capital Prishtina/Priština. Households in rural 
areas also receive a higher amount on average (total 
remittances in cash and in kind amount to € 2,166 
versus € 1,733 for urban dwellers - Table 4.2). 
Characteristics Urban Rural
Migration incidence 36.7% 37.0%
Remittance incidence* 23.6% 26.3%
Mean value of remittances* (annual, EUR) 1733 2166
Studies have also shown that rural migrants from 
Kosovo are more likely to remit, and to remit more 
than their urban counterparts even if they have low-
er incomes than the migrants from urban areas.81 As 
can be seen in Table 4.3 there are also marked dif-
ferences in remittance behaviour across ethnicities. 
Kosovo Albanian households are most likely both 
to have migrant family members (39 percent) and to 
receive remittances82 from them (27 percent). 
Characteristics K-Alb K-Serb K-
Other*
K-RAE
Migration incidence 
(%)
39.4% 12.3% 24.0% 18.3%
Remittance incidence 
(%)
27.3% 6.7% 11.0% 11.0%
Mean value of remit-
tances (annual, Euro) 
1,970 2,032 1,480 1,158
The incidence of migration and remittances is low-
est among Kosovo Serbs, with other ethnicities in 
between. However, those K-Albanian and K-Serb 
households that do receive remittances receive sim-
ilar amounts (approximately € 2,000), somewhat 
higher than other ethnic (K-Other) groups at just 
under € 1,500 and the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian 
minority (K-RAE) at € 1,150.
The differences in incidence of remittances between 
ethnicities could primarily be due to the different 
household structures among the ethnicities. First, al-
though this cannot be established from this data, the 
significantly smaller share of K-Serbs households 
with migrants compared to other ethnic groups 
could be due to whole households emigrating, rath-
er than just having individual household members 
emigrating.83 
Second, the lower probability of receiving remit-
tances for K-Serbs compared to K-Albanians, 
among households that have migrants, could be due 
to differing relationships between the migrants and 
the households left behind. Namely, whilst ’broth-
ers’ and ‘children’ are most likely to be cited as 
remittance senders by Kosovan households of all 
ethnic backgrounds, only 47 percent of K-Serbs 
report having a brother and/or child as a migrant, 
compared to 70 percent of K-Albanians and a range 
of 43-76 percent for other ethnic groups.
4.2 Key labour force 
indicators for remittance 
recipient vs. non-recipient 
households
Remittance recipients and non-recipients are also 
significantly different in terms of labour force par-
ticipation and employment status (see Table 4.4 
below).While the mean household size is simi-
lar, recipients have a slightly higher mean number 
of working age adults.Working age adults in re-
mittance recipient households face higher unem-
ployment rates compared to those in non-recipient 
households (44 percent versus 40 percent) and they 
are less likely to be economically active (70 percent 
versus 65 percent). 
The lower activity rate among remittance recipients 
may be due to the discouraged unemployed recipi-
ents having lost hope of finding work, having more 
household work to do, spending more time in sub-
sistence agriculture or the fact that some recipients 
may be in education and are therefore less available 
or less interested in outside employment. Finally, 
the lower activity rate among remittance recipients 
may suggest that remittances may keep individu-
TABLE 4.2 Incidence and value of remittances
according to area of residence
Table 4.4: Mean labour force indicators 
Table 4.3: Incidence and value of remittances
according to ethnic groups
*The asterisk denotes differences which are statistically significant at 5%
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from (UNDP, 2011) 
*The asterisk denotes differences which are statistically significant at 5%
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from (UNDP, 2011) 
*The asterisk denotes differences which are statistically significant at 5% 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from (UNDP, 2011)  
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Characteristics Remittance 
recipients
Non 
remittance 
recipients
Household members 4.9 4.8
   of which working age adults* 3.79 3.65
   of which labour market participants* 64.9% 70.5%
   of which currently employed* 56.0% 60.1%
Reservation wage (€) 268 260
als out of the labour market due to the ‘reservation 
wage effect’ which implies that individuals who can 
fall back on remittances require a higher wage be-
fore they will accept a job. However, this seems less 
likely to be the case considering that there is no ev-
idence that remittance recipients have significantly 
higher self-reported reservation wages (see Table 
4.4).84 Similarly, the share of economically inac-
tive individuals who report they would be willing 
to work is the same, regardless of whether they have 
a migrant connection or not.85 Finally, it should be 
noted that from the perspective of human develop-
ment, it can be argued that any potential reservation 
wage effect may have a positive side as recipients 
might not have to accept a job that is considered 
undignified (i.e. below one’s reservation wage), 
or they have a choice to pursue education both of 
which constitute an element of freedom and hence 
human development. 
4.3 Effects of remittances 
on household consumption,
human development and 
business
This section looks at the relationship between (inci-
dence and value of) remittances and consumption, 
investment in human development and business in-
vestment at household level.86   
The number of household members needs to be tak-
en into account for this analysis along with the age 
composition particularly as remittance-receiving 
households have on average, a significantly larger 
share of children under 15, a group which is typi-
cally expected to have lower consumption needs.87 
To avoid any distortions in this regard, this section 
analyses the effect of remittances on the level of per 
adult-equivalent consumption expenditure.88 
A comparison of mean levels of consumption ex-
penditure in this regard suggests that the consump-
tion of remittance receiving households in Kosovo 
is 8 percent higher than that of non-remittance re-
ceiving households (Table 4.5).89 
Similarly, remittance recipients report a rate of total 
expenditure per adult-equivalent that is 10 percent 
higher than their non-recipient counterparts; they 
also enjoy a level of income from other sources (i.e. 
excluding remittances) that is 6 percent higher than 
that of non-recipient households, which can at least 
in part explain their higher consumption level. As 
can be seen in Table 4.5 remittance-recipients spend 
more on most consumption categories, although the 
difference between the two groups is not always 
proportional across categories.90 
Differences are quite marked for spending on ed-
ucation and healthcare with remittance recipients 
spending 11 percent more on education and 48 per-
cent more on healthcare than non-recipients. Al-
though the values are small in absolute terms, this 
may suggest that remittances promote human devel-
opment, either directly through financing healthcare 
and education or through ‘freeing up’ households’ 
own resources. This is discussed further in Chap-
ters 6 and 7. In relation to savings and investment, 
a closer look at the likelihood of reporting invest-
ment expenditure suggests that remittance recipient 
households are more likely to report investment ex-
penditure than non-recipient counterparts (6.6 per-
cent compared to 5.5 percent). 
Indicator Remittance 
recipients
Non 
remittance 
recipients
Total income, excluding remittances* 197.3 186.3
Total expenditure* 135.3 122.4
Consumption expenditure, 
excluding durables and housing
Food 44.5 45.4
Non-food (e.g. alcohol, cigarettes, 
hygienic products)*
12.3 11.4
Semi-durable goods (e.g. clothes, 
furniture)
12.4 12.5
Healthcare* 8.5 5.7
Education 6 5.4
Transportation* 8.5 6.4
Entertainment 7.1 6.6
Durable goods* 5.4 3.5
Housing 17.2 15.2
Investment 7.3 4.1
Savings 2.6 2.8
Debt repayment 3.5 3.4
Remittance recipient households are more likely 
to possess durable assets or technology (Table 4.6 
below). The differences are particularly marked for 
goods such as computers, cameras, DVD players 
and electricity generators, as well as for Internet 
connections. A number of statistical analyses were 
conducted to further investigate the effect of remit-
tances on expenditure in health, education and in-
vestment. Positive findings (Statistical Annex, p.81-
83) were noted. 
Table 4.5: consumption expenditures 
according to (non) remittance recipients
*The asterisk denotes differences which are statistically significant at 5% 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from UNDP (2012) 
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Durable goods/technology Remittance recipients Non remittance recipients
TV set* 100% 99%
DVD player* 74% 61%
Satellite dish* 42% 36%
Washing machine* 97% 94%
Refrigerator* 97% 96%
Computer* 76% 65%
Internet connection* 70% 57%
Camera* 47% 31%
Mobile phone 94% 92%
Car* 68% 63%
Tractor* 30% 22%
Electricity generator at home* 29% 17%
Air conditioning 60% 50%
Table 4.6: Households’ possession of durable 
goods/technology (%)
*The asterisk denotes differences which are statistically significant at 5% 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from UNDP (2012) 
Key points – Chapter 4
• The incidence and value of remittances vary. Although rural and urban households have a virtually 
equal probability of having family members abroad, rural households are slightly more likely to 
receive remittances and they receive, on average, a larger amount of remittances compared to their 
urban counterparts.
• Compared to other ethnicities, K-Albanian households are considerably more likely to have mi-
grants abroad, as well as to receive remittances. K-Serb households are the least likely both to have 
migrants (including those in Serbia) and to receive remittances, after controlling for migration in-
cidence; however, they enjoy the highest amount of remittances, on average. K-Other households 
(including K-RAE) stand between K-Albanians and K-Serbs in terms of incidence of migration and 
remittances; K-RAE receive lower remittances than all other groups. 
• Remittance receipts are, on average, associated with a lower probability of a household living 
in (absolute) poverty, and with a higher level of consumption expenditure. Remittance recipient 
households are also more likely to own particular assets, especially durable goods such as comput-
ers, cameras, DVD players and electricity generators, and to have an Internet connection. Final-
ly, controlling for relevant household characteristics, including the amount of income from other 
sources (i.e. excluding remittances), remittances are found to have a positive effect on expenditure 
on health and education, as well as on the probability that a household invests in business activities. 
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CHAPTER 5
5. Gender effects and 
vulnerable groups left 
behind
This Chapter analyses both the gender effects of 
migration and the impact of mobility on vulnerable 
groups left behind. There are not that many studies 
that analyse the impact of migration on the migrants 
themselves – a topic that was well elaborated in the 
2009 Global Human Development Report. 
It is important to assess the benefits that migration 
brings to women migrants and the signal this may 
send to women in Kosovo who may see migration 
as a mechanism for improving their wellbeing. In 
addition, by examining how women migrants fare 
abroad, we may learn more about the possible im-
pact of this in Kosovo.
  
In many countries, migration is a household strategy 
aimed at improving not only the mover’s prospects, 
but those of the extended family as well. As a re-
sult and as noted in previous Chapters of this report, 
migration may affect the human development of 
migrants’ families and communities in many ways. 
Here we focus on women headed households as 
per the fact that this group faces more pronounced 
poverty in Kosovo than others and may therefore be 
considered as marginalized.91  
We also analyse the impact of migration on the so-
cial position of the women left behind who may ex-
perience greater empowerment as they become de-
cision makers within the household although their 
decision-making power may also decline if they live 
with their in-laws. Similarly, the impact on women’s 
labour force participation may be negative if wom-
en left behind have to perform more work within 
the household; or it may be positive when migrants 
transfer “social remittances” – new values, ideas, 
behaviours, and practices, including those in relation 
to attitudes towards gender and the gender balance 
(as emphasized strongly by the 2009 Global HDR). 
To our knowledge, this Chapter is the first attempt to 
address these issues in the context of Kosovo. 
Finally, we look at one other vulnerable group po-
tentially affected by migration, namely the elderly 
people left behind. The impact on them may be pos-
itive if they receive financial support or they may 
suffer emotionally especially if they are left alone. 
5.1 How do women migrants 
fare?
In this section we investigate whether migration 
contributes to the human development of Kosovan 
women migrants, given that they face different chal-
lenges and opportunities from men. Based on the 
latest 2012 Labour Force Survey,92  women in Koso-
vo face higher rates of unemployment (40 percent) 
than men (28.1 percent). In addition, only 17.8 per-
cent of working age women are economically active 
in Kosovo (i.e. part of the labour force), compared 
to 55.4 percent of men. These statistics suggest that 
despite some progress, gender inequality is still an 
issue of concern in Kosovo and given their poor 
prospects in the domestic labour market, Kosovan 
women may find migration an attractive option. 
According to the 2009 Global HDR, migration may 
enhance the education of women, offering them 
better opportunities for employment, and ensuring 
higher earnings, all contributing to human devel-
opment. One conclusion from the literature is that 
migrant women may be unlikely to return because 
they appreciate the freedom and autonomy that 
come from earning their own livelihood even when 
they are not truly happy with their income and oth-
er related-work conditions. In order to analyse this 
hypothesis we use the 2009 World Bank Migration 
Survey which collected information from 2,024 ran-
domly selected Kosovan migrant households wheth-
er or not they send remittances.93  We also examine 
the characteristics of women as remitters using data 
from the 2011 UNDP Kosovo Remittance Survey 
that included interviews with remitters conducted 
either face-to-face or via telephone. 
5.1.1 A profile of Kosovan women
migrants
Data from latest Census held in 2011 shows that 
out of 380,826 migrants, 43 percent are women.94 
While the early migration waves were dominated 
by men, an increasing number of women started to 
emigrate from 1991 onwards (Figure 5.1). Accord-
ing to the 2011 Census, 46 percent of migrants left 
for family-related reasons; 35 percent for employ-
ment; 8 percent due to the conflict; and only 1 per-
cent for educational reasons. Similarly, according to 
the World Bank Migration Survey,95 70 percent of 
women migrants have left for marriage and fami-
ly-related reasons while finding a job (at 16 percent) 
is the third most important reason given. 
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Marriage and family remained the most important 
reasons for women’s migration across all migration 
waves (Figure 5.2). Women migrants live mostly in 
Germany (35 percent) followed by Switzerland (24 
percent), and Italy (6 percent).96 
5.1.2 Migrant women: how do they 
fare abroad in terms of human 
capital development
As can be seen in Figure 5.3 women migrants seem 
to be more educated than women in Kosovo.97 
Women remitters are particularly well-educated. 
The share of illiterate women migrants declined 
over the years whereas the share of women with 
secondary education increased from the first to the 
third wave (Figure 5.4). Similarly, education level 
is highest among women migrants aged 20-24 years 
old and lowest among women older than 55 years 
old (Tables 5.1 and 5.2). 
According to the World Bank migration survey 
about 11 percent of women and 9.5 percent of 
male migrants increased their education level while 
abroad translating into better opportunities in the 
labour market and easier entry into the host soci-
ety’s economic mainstream which in turn leads to a 
higher chance of financial support to families in the 
country of origin.98
According to the World Bank migration survey 
about 11 percent of women and 9.5 percent of 
male migrants increased their education level while 
abroad translating into better opportunities in the 
labour market and easier entry into the host soci-
ety’s economic mainstream which in turn leads to a 
higher chance of financial support to families in the 
country of origin. 
A total of 34 percent of working age women mi-
grants are employed abroad as opposed to 10 per-
cent of working age women living in Kosovo.99 
However, women migrants are more likely to hold 
low skilled jobs. 
Permanent migrants often have greater access to ed-
ucation, employment and health services, while the 
access for temporary or irregular migrants tends to 
be much more restricted. Data presented in Figure 
5.5 reveals women migrants hold stronger positions 
than men in terms of legal status with 86 percent of 
them holding a permanent resident status compared 
to 74.1 percent of men.
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Figure 5.1: Kosovo migrants, by migration waves
Figure 5.3: Education level of women, by 
migration status
Figure 5.2: Reasons for migration of female 
migrants, by migration waves
Source: KAS, 2014
Source: World Bank 2009 Migration survey
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Table 5.1 Education levels of female 
migrants by age (aged 15+)
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15-19 1.4% 5.1% 16.6% 73.0% 3.8% 0.0%
20-24 0.8% 1.4% 16.1% 70.0% 9.9% 1.4%
25-29 0.9% 0.0% 36.1% 57.0% 4.9% 0.7%
30-34 0.0% 0.0% 54.2% 40.0% 3.3% 2.3%
35-39 0.0% 1.2% 45.7% 44.0% 8.8% 0.0%
40-44 0.0% 0.0% 60.6% 34.0% 5.1% 0.0%
45-49 0.0% 0.0% 52.5% 33.0% 14.7% 0.0%
50-54 7.0% 12.2% 46.6% 34.0% 0.0% 0.0%
55-59 6.9% 0.0% 79.3% 14.0% 0.0% 0.0%
60-64 39.9% 0.0% 60.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Source: World Bank 2009 Migration survey
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15-19 0.65% 0.68% 87.68% 10.99% 0.00% 0.00%
20-24 1.12% 0.90% 32.08% 57.90% 7.82% 0.17%
25-29 1.59% 1.24% 44.98% 38.37% 12.65% 1.17%
30-34 1.72% 1.44% 60.48% 29.39% 6.19% 0.79%
35-39 2.01% 1.57% 63.78% 27.54% 4.46% 0.64%
40-44 2.71% 1.95% 63.91% 26.52% 4.25% 0.66%
45-49 4.36% 2.79% 61.07% 26.73% 4.31% 0.74%
50-54 6.01% 3.62% 64.47% 21.09% 4.23% 0.58%
55-59 8.04% 4.42% 69.86% 14.51% 2.78% 0.38%
60-64 11.27% 5.45% 72.07% 9.69% 1.32% 0.20%
This places women migrants in a more advanta-
geous position as they can benefit more from educa-
tion in the host country and they will have no legal 
barriers to employment. 
Additionally having a settled legal status provides 
them with access to social assistance schemes which 
according to the 2009 HDR policy assessment is 
generally granted to all permanent migrants in most 
host countries. 
In relation to residential status and as seen in Table 
5.3, employment rates are higher among those who 
hold permanent status and decreases for those that 
hold only residential or temporary status, though a 
higher drop can be seen for men than women. An 
analysis of World Bank data found that less female 
(6.8 percent) than male (11.1) migrants are likely 
to return in the next five years (Figure 5.6). When 
reviewing the factors that determine the decision to 
return only age and links to their families in Kosovo 
have a significant impact on women while for men 
the decision is influenced by a number of factors in-
cluding education acquisition while abroad; whether 
or not migration occurred for work related reasons; 
frequency of visits and plans to invest in Kosovo. 
Male and female migrants are less likely to return 
home if they hold a permanent status, have family 
abroad or have stayed abroad for a longer period of 
time. It can be concluded therefore that female mi-
grants are less likely to return to Kosovo due in part 
at least to the fact that they settle well and establish a 
better life in host countries compared to the life that 
they could have in Kosovo. 
In general and based on the data presented in this 
section, women migrants fare better in the labour 
market and a greater share have benefited from ed-
ucation while abroad in comparison to women at 
home. 
In addition and since the majority of Kosovan wom-
en abroad hold permanent status in the residing 
countries, their potential to benefit from education, 
employment and social schemes is greater than that 
of men. Finally, the majority of Kosovan women 
abroad speak at least one foreign language which 
contributes to greater integration in host countries.
Figure 5.4: Education level of female migrants, 
by waves
Figure 5.6: Likelihood of migrant returning in 
next 5 years (% within each gender group)
Figure 5.5: Residential status of migrants, 
by gender
Table 5.2: Highest education level 
completed for women in Kosovo aged 15+, 
2011 Census data
Source: KAS, Census, 2011
Source: World Bank 2009 Migration survey
Source: World Bank 2009 Migration survey
Source: World Bank 2009 Migration survey
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5.1.3 Financial contribution of 
women migrants to Kosovo
This section examines for the first time the contribu-
tion of remittances from women migrants to Koso-
vo. Evidence from other countries suggests that 
despite receiving lower wages on average, women 
tend to send a larger proportion of their incomes 
home and on a more regular basis.100 
M
en
W
om
en
Citizen 78 48
Permanent resident 75 35
Temporary resident 2-5 years 61 20
Temporary resident 6-10 years 59 34
Family reunification 42 0
Work visa 75 34
Illegal without papers 31 0
Total 71.10% 34.40%
However, this doesn’t  seem to hold true for where 
a significantly lower number of women send remit-
tances than men (14 percent vs. 60 percent).101  As 
can be seen in Table 5.3 the employment rate of 
Kosovan male migrants within each group of resi-
dential status is higher than that of women. None of 
the female migrants that possess a family reunifica-
tion status are employed as opposed to 42 percent of 
men in this category and only one third of women 
that possess a working visa are employed compared 
to more than two thirds of men with the same sta-
tus. This highlights the fact that male migrants from 
Kosovo tend to perform better than women migrants 
in the labour market and seem to make a better use 
of economic and employment opportunities in re-
siding countries. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
households in Kosovo usually identify the male mi-
grant in the family as the main remittance sender 
which could imply that the contribution of women 
remitters is likely to be underestimated. 
Although there is no empirical evidence to sup-
port this, the issue was raised during focus group 
discussions undertaken as part of the research for 
this report. When participants were asked about who 
supports the family from abroad, the name of a man 
was given in every case. However, when asked spe-
cifically if any women from the household that live 
abroad contribute the answer was positive in about 
80 percent of the cases and all participants agreed 
that women’s contribution to remittances tends to be 
underestimated. However the overall amount of re-
mittances sent by women (€ 1,100) is less than that 
sent by men (€ 1,600). 
Traditional practices seem also to affect the final 
destination of remittances from women. As can be 
seen in Figure 5.7 Kosovan women tend to send 
remittance to in-laws implying perhaps that once 
married they begin to support their husband’s fami-
ly feeling less obliged to remit to their own parents. 
In contrast to findings for other countries therefore, 
women migrants from Kosovo tend to play a much 
smaller role as remitters than men. This is not suffi-
ciently explained by their lower employment ratio. 
Rather, traditional gender roles and affiliations also 
appear to affect this which raises the question of the 
need for appropriate policy interventions that might 
help remove barriers and increase the incentive for 
women migrants to send remittances. 
5.2 Financial remittances in 
women-headed households
In this section, we use data from the 2011 UNDP 
Remittance Survey102  to investigate how remittanc-
es received by women headed households in Kosovo 
affect access to education, health, housing, and oth-
er aspects of wellbeing for this potentially vulner-
able group. While remittances may bring positive 
effects they could also exert a negative impact on 
labour force participation, particularly for women 
who are also the head of the household. In Box 5.1 
we conclude that most women heads of household 
in Kosovo are either widowed, have their husbands 
living abroad or are not married.
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Table 5.3: Employment rate by residential status 
(% employed within each group)
Figure 5.7: To whom migrants remit, by gender
Source: World Bank 2009 Migration survey. Note: for all categories there are 
observations 
Source: World Bank 2009 Migration survey
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According to official statistics, only 8 percent of 
households in Kosovo are headed by a woman.103 
However, data from the KRHS 2011 suggests a 
somewhat higher share of about 14 percent. Data 
from the same report reveals that women headed 
households with a migrant abroad are somewhat 
more likely to receive remittances (73 percent vs. 68 
percent; Figure 5.8) and that in 13 percent of cases 
the husband is the remitter.104 
As shown in Table 5.4, remittances add on average 
€ 150 to the monthly budget of the women headed 
households and € 124 on average to male headed 
households. 
In the absence of remittances, income in male head-
ed households is greater by almost € 30 per month.
Educational level is lower for adults living in re-
mittance recipient households and as can be seen in 
Figure 5.9 the difference is greater among women.
 
Total monthly income 
excluding remittances
Total monthly income 
including remittances
Contribu-
tion of 
remit-
tances to 
recipients
Recipient Non 
recipient
Recipient Non 
recipient
Women 
headed 
household
557 667 707 667 150
Men 
headed 
household
583 628 708 628 124
As shown in Figure 5.10, the majority of remittanc-
es are used for immediate consumption needs. Male 
head of households spend more on durables and 
slightly less on housing and human investments. In-
terestingly, women spend twice as much as men on 
business investments. These findings may suggest 
that women use remittances more often for human 
capital development and investment purposes. In 
some of the literature on migration the importance 
of remittances for development are discounted be-
cause they are partly spent on consumption. The 
2009 Global HDR considers this criticism mistaken 
for two reasons: 
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Figure 5.8: Migration and remittance receipt, 
by gender of the household head
Figure 5.9: Average educational attainment 
(in years) of adults in Kosovo by gender 
and receipt of remittances
Table 5.4 Contribution of remittances to 
monthly income, by remittance recipient and 
gender of the household head
Source:UNDP-KRHS, (2011) Source: UNDP – KRHS, 2011
Source: UNDP - KRHS, (2011)
0%
Do you have
someone
abroad
Remittance
receiving
household
Share
of Kosovo
household
that receive
remittances
Women headed Men headed
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
44.0%  36.0%
73.0%    68.0%
31.0% 24.0%
Box 5.1: In what circumstances is a woman statistically 
classified as household head? 
According to KRHS 2011 data, the majority of women household heads are married (57 percent); al-
most 30 percent are widows; 10 percent are not married; and 3 percent are divorced. Among married 
women headed households, 46 percent have a family member living abroad. Among that group, in 
25 percent of cases the woman’s husband is abroad. Thus most women heads of household are either 
widowed, have their husbands living abroad, or are not married, which indicates that a woman is 
considered a head of household mainly in cases when a man is not alive or at home.
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Firstly, consumption is inherently valuable and often 
has long term, investment-like effects, especially in 
poor communities. Secondly, improvements in nu-
trition and other basic consumption items enhance 
human capital and hence future incomes. 
Figure 5.11 presents a somewhat positive picture 
in relation to the impact of remittances on female 
headed households from a human development per-
spective.  In comparison, female headed households 
that receive remittances spend more on education, 
housing and savings than non-recipient households 
and less on consumption (i.e., food).105 In part, this 
observation appears to reflect a higher number of 
children and young adults in secondary and tertia-
ry education in remittance-receiving households 
leading to higher spending on education among this 
group.106 The 2011 KRHS asked the respondents to 
rank  their family situation in relation to education, 
housing, health and other aspects where a higher 
score indicated a more difficult situation. In Figure 
5.12 we split responses to this question among re-
mittance receiving and non-receiving women head-
ed households. 
To a certain degree and even though women house-
hold heads that receive remittances are materially 
better off, they consider their situation less satisfac-
tory than non-recipient households. 
In regard to healthcare and according to the 2010 
KRHS fewer women heads of remittance recipient 
households (9 percent) find it difficult to meet the 
cost of seeing a doctor. However, the data suggests 
that gender-based differences are significant only 
for households in rural areas as in urban areas there 
are no gender-based differences in this regard. 
Literature suggests that migration can negatively in-
fluence labour force participation because members 
of remittance receiving households have less incen-
tive to search for and find a job107 while empirical 
studies have found that this might be more likely 
among women.108
To examine whether this is the case in Kosovo and 
particularly whether remittances further reduce the 
already low participation of women in the labour 
force, we use KRHS 2011 data to compare em-
ployment, unemployment and the inactivity rate 
between households that receive and do not receive 
remittances.  As can been seen in Figure 5.13, em-
ployment rates are lower among remittance recip-
ients, regardless of gender. The share of receiving 
households looking for work is also lower compared 
to non-receiving households especially for women 
(Figure 5.14). One explanation for a greater inac-
tivity rate among women in remittance receiving 
households is that women left behind have to take 
over more responsibilities for their children, elderly 
and other dependent household members. 
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Figure 5.10: Usage of remittances by the gender of 
the household heads
Figure 5.12: Evaluation of present 
social-economic situation of the women 
headed households, by remittance receipt
Figure 5.11: Expenditure patterns of recipients and 
non-recipients, female household heads
Source: UNDP - KRHS, 2011
Source: UNDP - KRHS, 2011
Source: UNDP - KRHS, 2011
Figure 5.15:  Reservation wage for female 
headed households
Source: UNDP - KRHS, 2011
As discussed in Chapter 4, some studies suggest that 
remittances as a form of non-labour income raise the 
reservation wage of a potential worker and thus ren-
der it more likely that the household member will 
not look for work.109 
This appears to be borne out in the data presented in 
Figure 5.15 where more non recipient women head-
ed households (approximately 85 percent) would 
accept a job for up to Euro 250 as opposed to just 60 
percent of recipient counterparts.
5.3 Social remittances and 
women left behind
Migration may also affect women left behind in 
Kosovo through social remittances such as values, 
ideas, behaviours, and practices that can be trans-
ferred by migrants from their host countries.110  Al-
though considered important, social remittances are 
not as easily observed and quantified as financial re-
mittances and to-date their impact has been largely 
ignored by studies in Kosovo.111 For the purposes of 
this study a focus group was organized in order to 
gain a better understanding of whether the migration 
of husbands leads to greater decision making power 
for women, if (and how) the mind-sets of husbands 
change regarding gender roles, what happens when 
women left behind live with their in-laws, who de-
cides how remittances are used, what is the impact 
for women left behind on their participation in the 
labour force, and how remittances affect human de-
velopment overall.112   
The focus group was composed of 13 women 
from Gjilan/Gnjilane, Kamenica and Podujeva all 
of whom are married with husbands abroad. Five 
out of the 13 participants live separately with chil-
dren, and eight live with their husband’s family. 
The group was quite diverse as it was composed of 
women with different educational backgrounds and 
also with different labour force statuses. Their hus-
bands were in Germany, France, Switzerland and 
Slovenia. Eleven of the participants stated that their 
spouses have working permits in the country where 
they work while two were said to be without per-
mits.
The majority of the participants were not employed 
which was mainly attributed to lack of jobs, rather 
than the absence of husbands. Nevertheless in some 
cases family responsibilities were cited as a barrier 
to employment with a higher burden for those living 
with in-laws who may require care as well. Asked 
whether their husbands motivate them to get a job, 
participants responded that husbands neither moti-
vate nor hinder them but are aware of their many 
obligations at home. Asked what would be the mini-
mum wage for which they would work, the respons-
es ranged between 200 and 300 Euros which is just 
below the average wage in Kosovo which implies 
that women would prefer to work regardless of the 
fact that their husbands work abroad and send remit-
tances. The focus group found that remittances have 
improved the quality of life and have had a positive 
impact on children’s education. 
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Figure 5.13: Percentage of employed household 
heads, by gender and receipt of remittances
Figure 5.14: Percentage of unemployed 
household heads, by gender and receipt 
of remittances
Figure 5.15:  Reservation wage for female 
headed households
Source: UNDP – KRHS, 2011
Source: UNDP – KRHS, 2011
Source: UNDP – KRHS, 2011
Remittances are considered vital to finance not only 
the education of children but also that of spouses 
left behind. ‘It would have been impossible with 
Kosovo salaries to bear study costs’ was a statement 
made by one participant. In relation to finance, par-
ticipants generally agreed that their life is better due 
to the migration of their spouses, but emotionally 
participants felt the separation of the family was not 
worth the financial gain.   
To understand whether living abroad in developed 
countries influenced the mind-set of men, partici-
pants noted that no change had occurred as their hus-
bands were quite modern and being abroad had not 
changed them. Only two out of the 13 participants 
had visited their husbands abroad and they stated 
that the experience during these visits has positive-
ly influenced their emancipation and the way they 
think about gender roles. Most participants felt that 
being alone at home has increased their confidence 
and that they have greater decision making power. 
However, more responsibilities were also noted as 
being quite a burden.113 Managing families by them-
selves was also noted to be difficult, especially when 
children get older. 
When the focus group participants that live with in-
laws were asked which member of the family re-
ceives remittances and how decisions on their use 
are made, no common pattern was found. While in 
some cases the women received the money and de-
cided how to spend it, in others the in-laws decided 
how the money was used, although focus group par-
ticipants always had a say in this decision. 
Participants living with their in-laws stated that they 
do not need to consult with their in-laws about their 
own lives, but they directly communicate and con-
sult with their husbands as a matter of course. Never-
theless, some barriers were noted, especially in rela-
tion to leaving the house with participants reporting 
the need to inform their in-laws about any plans they 
might have to go out.  ‘If my husband was here that 
would not have been a problem’ was a statement 
of one participant.‘Our mentality requires that we 
consult with our in-laws. I cannot fully ignore my 
in-laws. This is a burden to me’ she added. Similarly 
the absence of a husband was also found to have an 
impact on the freedom of daughters at home. From 
responses, it was evident that when women live with 
their children only, girls are not very free to go out 
as mothers feel more fear and more responsibility 
than they might if their husbands were at home. 
The freedom of daughters is even more curtailed 
when living with their in-laws since their grandpar-
ents do not understand their need to leave the house 
to socialise. In terms of how receiving remittanc-
es makes women feel, most respondents report that 
they would rather work themselves and have their 
own budget than have to ask for money and report 
on how it is spent. 
To summarise, migration has contributed to enhanc-
ing the confidence and decision making power of 
Kosovan women left behind. Contrary to theoretical 
predictions, in Kosovo the migration of husbands 
does not push women out of the labour force, rath-
er it is poor economic prospects that lead to high 
unemployment. When women live with their in-
laws, decisions on how remittances are used are ei-
ther made by the women or shared with in-laws. It 
seems that one negative consequence of migration 
is less freedom for women and daughters as moth-
ers feel more responsibility towards their daughters 
and freedom is negatively influenced when there are 
grandparents in the family. Most women stated that 
their husbands were quite liberal prior to migration 
but some positive change is noted as a result of their 
living abroad.
5.4 Impact of mobility on 
gender and elderly people 
left behind 
The impact of mobility on elderly relatives at home 
can be significant especially in societies where fam-
ilies traditionally live together and where there are 
weak social systems in terms of care for the elder-
ly. A study conducted in Kyrgyzstan found that 62 
percent of elderly respondents considered migration 
to be positive due for the most part to the financial 
support provided by the migrant. However, the re-
port found also this support is sent only as long as 
the spouse and children of a migrant remain at home 
with the elderly person.114 Another study in Thai-
land found a negative impact where migration has 
resulted in some elderly people being left alone with 
less care provided.115  Since no studies of this nature 
have been conducted in Kosovo a focus group dis-
cussion was organized during which it was found 
that for some households’ remittances from abroad 
are the main source of income. It was also revealed 
that remittances are sent primarily because of the 
presence of the elderly and that they will stop once 
parents are no longer alive. 
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In a few cases it was highlighted that siblings had 
agreed amongst themselves for one to stay to look 
after the parents and for one to migrate and send 
money home.  In the majority of cases the elderly do 
not manage the money even though the lion’s share 
of remittances (about 75 percent), are used for their 
benefit and mostly for healthcare. In some cases, the 
elderly also benefited from medical check-ups in 
migrants’ host countries.
Migrants visit Kosovo two to three times a year, in 
part to visit elderly relatives. The presence of an el-
derly person was not found to affect the employment 
rate of household members as long as the elderly 
person is in good health.  However, one participant 
expressed the feeling that taking care of parents is a 
sort of burden. It was also emphasized that the im-
pact on labour force participation can be more pro-
nounced among women since they bear the greatest 
burden in care-giving.
One group reported not being able to migrate be-
cause they could not leave the elderly all alone. It is 
generally considered in-appropriate in Kosovo for 
the elderly to be looked after by someone other than 
family members – this is considered shameful and it 
rarely occurs. One participant stated that it would be 
good if there were nursing homes where the elderly 
can also find health care, companionship and enter-
tainment. Family members looking after elderly in 
Kosovo reported being able to continue their studies 
with the financial support from migrants whilst also 
looking after their elderly relative. 
In conclusion, these findings suggest that elderly 
people in Kosovo tend to benefit from migration: 
they are not left alone because family members ne-
gotiate how and who will take care of them, whilst 
they benefit financially from remittances. 
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Key points – Chapter 5
• Kosovo female migrants fare better in the labour market compared to Kosovan women. More wom-
en than men improved their education status while abroad, thus experiencing a greater human cap-
ital development. Since more women than men hold permanent status in the host countries, their 
potential to benefit from education, employment and social schemes is also greater. Most women 
speak at least one foreign language which contributes to greater integration. One new finding in 
this research is that women migrants play a much smaller role as remitters than men, which is not 
sufficiently explained by their lower employment ratio. Traditional gender roles and affiliations 
have been highlighted as one potential explanation.
• Data from the 2011 KRHS reveal that female-headed households are especially likely to have 
someone living abroad; furthermore, those that have a migrant abroad are somewhat more likely 
than similar male-headed households to receive remittances (73 percent vs. 68 percent). Remit-
tances add € 150 on average to the monthly budget of the female headed households and € 124 on 
average to men headed households. While spending patterns do not differ much between women 
and male headed households, men spend more on durables and a little less on housing and human 
investments. Interestingly, women spend twice as much as men on business investments. These 
findings may suggest that women use remittances more often than men for human capital develop-
ment and investment purposes.
• Remittances are associated with lower labour force participation and employment of women. One 
third of non-recipient women household heads are employed, compared to 29 percent of their re-
cipient counterparts. Furthermore, the share of female household heads that are unemployed and 
not looking for a job (i.e. economically inactive) is seven percentage points higher among recip-
ients of remittances. The share of female heads that are searching for jobs is also lower among 
remittance-receiving households. One possible explanation for higher “economic inactivity” rates 
among women in remittance receiving households is that women left behind have to take over more 
responsibilities for their children, elderly and other dependent household members.
• Migration and remittances may affect women left behind not only through financial, but also 
through social remittances: values, ideas, behaviours, and practices that can be transferred by mi-
grants from their host countries to their countries of origin. Findings from focus groups discussions 
about women left behind confirm that migration has greatly contributed to the economic wellbeing 
of their families. While burdening them with familial responsibilities, migration has at the same 
time contributed to enhancing the confidence and decision making power of women left behind. 
When women live with their in-laws, decisions on how remittances are used are either made by the 
women or shared with in-laws. One negative consequence of migration may be less independence 
for daughters as mothers feel more responsibility towards their daughters and the freedom is nega-
tively influenced when there are grandparents in the family.
• Through focus groups we have found that elderly people in need of care tend to benefit greatly from 
migration since their living costs and especially health costs are covered more easily and the finan-
cial burden of family members living with the elderly is reduced. We found that even if possibilities 
existed for other (care-giving) family members to migrate, they would forego this opportunity to 
care for their elderly relatives. In return, they may also benefit from remittances, such as for the 
purpose of continuing their education.

CHAPTER 6
6. Remittances, 
migration and access 
to education 
Existing research shows an ambiguous relationship 
between remittances and educational outcomes.116 
With this in mind, Section 6.1 of this Chapter anal-
yses the relationship between migration and educa-
tional outcomes of those left behind in Kosovo on 
the assumption that remittances increase incomes, 
help to lift budgetary constraints and allow families 
to invest in education while Section 6.2 analyses 
migration and its impact on educational attainment 
with regard to remittances. 
6.1 Remittances and 
educational participation at 
the household level
In the aftermath of the conflict, the education system 
in Kosovo has faced many challenges and develop-
ments. Primary and lower secondary education (five 
and four years respectively) are compulsory and free 
of charge to all.117 Primary education begins when 
the child turns six. Upper secondary education is 
categorised into general and professional education 
and lasts three to four years; it is not mandatory but 
highly encouraged. Higher education is available in 
various universities and other public or private edu-
cational institutions. The Bologna system has been 
adopted since 1999 and the degrees offered include 
Bachelor, Master and PhD level qualifications. The 
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology is 
responsible for all issues related to education. 
 
The Kosovo Remittances Study conducted in 2012 
contains educational information for all household 
members, including data on children below 15 years 
of age (UNDP, 2012). For the purposes of this Chap-
ter however the population of interest is youth, de-
fined as individuals aged between 16 and 25 years, 
since this age group must decide between education 
(secondary schooling and university) and employ-
ment (at home or abroad).118 
As can be seen in Table 6.1, educational attendance 
in secondary school is higher for both men and 
women in non-remittance recipient households as 
compared to those who receive remittances. Similar 
results were obtained for university education (Ta-
ble 6.2).
Age 16-18
Attending 
secondary 
education
Not attending
secondary 
education
Men Women Men Women
Recipient remittances 71.40% 58.40% 28.60% 41.60%
Non- recipients 80.80% 62.10% 19.20% 37.95%
Age 19-25
Attending 
university education
Not attending 
university education
Men Women Men Women
Recipient remittances 25.80% 15.10% 74.20% 84.90%
Non- recipients 28.90% 17.40% 71.30% 82.60%
Findings from Table 6.3 show that a higher per-
centage of men in non-recipient households are em-
ployed in comparison to remittance recipient house-
holds 70.6 percent vs. 59.90 percent and the same is 
true for women (26.4 percent vs. 15.7 percent). 
Age 19-25
Employed Not employed 
Men Women Men Women
Recipient remittances 59.90% 15.70% 40.10% 84.30%
Non- recipients 70.60% 26.40% 29.40% 73.60%
Further statistical analysis (Statistical Annex, p.81-
83), shows that remittances in general are not con-
sidered significant predictors of educational atten-
dance for people aged 16 -25 years in Kosovo. This 
is more influenced by factors including the presence 
of adults in the household, the education level of 
those adults and the amount of money available at 
the household level allocated to education. This was 
found to be true for both men and women. These 
findings are somewhat consistent with other studies 
which show that heads of non-remittance recipient 
households have, on average, completed one more 
year of education as compared to their remittance 
receiving counterparts.119 Most remittance receiv-
ing individuals reported that the remitter was either 
a son or older brother (Figure 6.1), the absence of 
whom has a negative impact on education attain-
ment in two ways. 
MIGRATION AS A FORCE FOR DEVELOPMENT 59
Table 6.1 Secondary education attendance by 
gender and receipt of remittances individuals 
aged 16-18
Table 6.2 University education attendance by 
gender and receipt of remittances aged 19-25
Table 6.3 Employment status by gender and 
receipt of remittances  for individuals 
aged 19-25
Source: UNDP - KRHS (2012)
Source: UNDP - KRHS (2012)
Source: UNDP - KRHS (2012)
Firstly, it creates conditions for younger adolescent 
men to engage in activities not related to education 
and secondly it tends to put pressure on the remain-
ing children at home increasing their level of family 
responsibilities with a negative effect on their edu-
cational aspirations.
It is therefore difficult to find a direct relationship 
between remittances and increased educational at-
tainment in Kosovo.120 This might be because there 
is no such effect in Kosovo. Future research should 
pay attention to questions of education, including 
attendance and quality among families that receive 
and do not receive remittances.
6.2 Migration and education
This section aims to examine the relationship be-
tween education and migration and specifically how 
migration affects the educational outcomes of mi-
grants from Kosovo. Research shows that migration 
is likely to enhance educational attainment, especial-
ly among children, because migrant families want 
to provide better educational opportunities for their 
children.121 Other findings show that 22 percent of 
migrants from Kosovo obtained at least part of their 
education while abroad.122 It is important to distin-
guish between education acquired at home, before 
migration, and education acquired after migration. 
This part of the report will focus on data gathered 
for a Migration Survey in 2009 undertaken by the 
World Bank, which contains information on migra-
tion and related socio-demographics. 
Findings from the survey show that the migrants’ 
educational level increases in the country of destina-
tion from the level they had when they left. 
As can be seen in Figure 6.2, the percentage of in-
dividuals who had not completed their primary ed-
ucation dropped in the country of destination while 
the percentage of those who finished secondary and 
university education increased. Additional findings 
from the same survey show changes in education-
al attainment among migrants through the various 
waves of migration (see Figure 6.3).
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Figure 6.1: Relationship to remittent
Figure 6.2: Educational attainment 
prior to and after migration
Figure 6.3 Educational attainment of 
migrants before leaving their home country 
through the waves of migrations
Figure 6.4 Educational attainment of 
migrants in their host country through the 
waves of migration
Source: UNDP - Kosovo Remittances Survey, 2012
Source: World Bank Migration Survey, 2009
Source: World Bank Migration Survey, 2009
Source: World Bank Migration Survey, 2009
Table 6.4: Migration for educational purposes 
through waves of migration
Table 6.5: Migration for educational purposes
by gender
Figure 6.5: Migration for educational purposes 
by age
Source: World Bank Migration Survey, 2009
It is interesting to observe that the highest number of 
migrants with a university education migrated after 
the conflict. As noted in Figures 6.4 educational at-
tainment in the host country improved for the most 
part across the waves of migration.While an average 
of just 2 percent of migrants reported educational 
purposes as their main reason to migrate (Table 6.4) 
the highest prevalence appeared in the post conflict 
period.
Migration for educational purposes
Waves of migration Yes No
(Pre- 1989) 0.0% 100.0%
(1989-1997) 0.9% 99.1%
(1998-1999) 3.4% 96.6%
(Post-1999) 3.0% 97.0%
More men than women gave education as the main 
reason to migrate (see Table 6.5) while the highest 
percentage of those who migrated for educational 
purposes are between 25-35 years old (Figure 6.5).
Waves of migration Males Females 
(Pre- 1989) 0.0% 0.0%
(1989-1997) 69.7% 30.3%
(1998-1999) 61.0% 39.0%
(Post-1999) 62.0% 38.0%
Germany is the most common destination for mi-
grants leaving for educational purposes (33.1 per-
cent), followed by Switzerland (21.4 percent), see 
Figure 6.6. Moreover, 43 percent of households with 
a family relation living outside Kosovo reported ed-
ucational benefits in knowing this migrant relation.
Findings from the same survey indicate that 43.8 
percent of individuals who migrated for educational 
purposes have a job in their country of destination 
with an average monthly wage of approximately € 
1600 per month which could indicate they secure 
lower paying jobs in their country of destination. 
Despite the general lack of data, an e-survey con-
ducted during April - May 2011 with 273 highly ed-
ucated and skilled returnees provides some insight 
into this group despite the fact that only 83 respon-
dents returned the questionnaire. The results indi-
cate that most of the participants, (85 percent) were 
part of a scholarship scheme, while only 15 percent 
were self-financed. Moreover, 90.3 percent of the 
respondents were employed.123  
In summary, analysis has found evidence to suggest 
an improved educational attainment rate for mi-
grants from Kosovo, especially those who left after 
1999. In addition migration for educational purpos-
es is mainly considered an option for young people 
(25-35 years old). 
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Table 6.4: Migration for educational purposes 
through waves of migration
Table 6.5: Migration for educational purposes
by gender
Figure 6.5: Migration for educational purposes 
by age
Figure 6.6: Countries of migration for 
educational purposes
Source: World Bank Migration Survey, 2009
Source: World Bank Migration Survey, 2009
Source: World Bank Migration Survey, 2009
Source: World Bank Migration Survey, 2009
15-24 
years old
25-35 
years old
36-47 
years old
>=48 
years old
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60% men
women
3.7% 1.4%
16.3% 42.1%
 56.5%  52.1%
6.2% 0.0%
17.3% 5.8%
0%
USA
Norway
France
Italy
Sweden
Switzerland
Austria
UK
Germany
5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
1.9%
3.4%
5.4%
6.4%
7.3%
10.4%
10.6%
21.4%
33.1%
CHAPTER 7
7. Remittances, 
migration and access 
to health care
In this Chapter, we focus on the impact of remittanc-
es on health(-care) expenditure. The section starts 
with an overview of the health system, followed by 
a review on the impact of remittances on health care 
expenditure amongst those left behind in Kosovo. 
The final part of the Chapter provides new find-
ings regarding the intention to seek health services 
abroad (mobility) and the impact of remittances on 
health care expenditure. 
7.1 Health care in Kosovo
The Kosovo health care system is based on the pre-
vious Semashko model of healthcare delivery, sim-
ilar to health systems utilized in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe.124 This model was character-
ised by a centralised and hierarchical system that 
faced many challenges including lack of skills and 
knowledge among health workers who were most-
ly poorly paid, a lack of equipment and inefficient 
and badly maintained facilities.125 The 1999 conflict 
caused a significant amount of damage to the health 
infrastructure making this a very challenging period 
for Kosovo’s already weak health system. 
Today, public health care services in Kosovo in-
clude the Central University Clinical Centre in Pr-
ishtina/Priština, seven regional hospitals managed 
by the Ministry of Health, and a network of family 
medicine health centres managed by municipal au-
thorities. In 2002, the Kosovo Health Reform was 
initiated with the support of international agencies 
and donors. The Health Sector Strategy 2010-2014 
now serves as a guideline for the development of 
the Kosovo Health System - in line with the govern-
ment’s financial resources and based on the health 
priorities developed in order to achieve the Millen-
nium Goals.126 While a legal framework is now in 
place for the health care system in Kosovo imple-
mentation is lacking and much remains to be done. 
The Law on Health Insurance was approved only in 
2014 and is expected to be implemented in the near 
future. 
Percival and Sondrop (2011) in their case study on 
health sector reform in Kosovo showed that the ex-
ternal nature of reform together with the compressed 
time frame of reform, and weak state capacity have 
presented significant challenges. 
Furthermore, as has been emphasized by Qosaj- 
Arenliu (2011) since it cannot function in isolation 
a health care institution reflects the political, eco-
nomic and social system in which it functions. In 
Kosovo this system is strongly influenced by high 
unemployment rates, poverty and corruption. Be-
sides, the current health system is funded mainly 
by tax revenues.  Spending on health accounts for 
about 3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, 
which covers only half the total cost with patients 
co-financing their care through out-of-pocket pay-
ments for necessary services. 
The 2008 World Bank Study on Kosovo Health Re-
forms shows that patients contribute in the form of 
user fees, payment for drugs, and other services. Ad-
ditionally, essential drugs are often not available in 
the family medicine centre or hospital pharmacies 
and patients have to purchase them in private phar-
macies. As a result, the cost of drugs represents 65 
percent of private health expenditure. Furthermore, 
the natural population growth in Kosovo at 18 net 
births per 1000 residents in 2011, is much higher 
than that of other countries in the region although a 
decreasing trend is noted of late.127  
7.2 Preference for 
treatment abroad
The report for Public Health Reform conducted in 
2011 finds that many Kosovans travel to other coun-
tries for healthcare services, due to distrust and a 
lack of confidence in the existing health system.128 
The Kosovo Mosaic Study (2012) shows a decrease 
in satisfaction from 2009 to 2012 with health care 
services in relation to the quality of staff, equality 
of treatment and access to medicines and supplies 
(p.82).129
The Statistical Annex to this Chapter presents de-
tailed results of analysis from studies on the use of 
health services abroad and the impact of remittances 
on health care expenditure at home. As discussed in 
the statistical analysis, from a total of 1,288 indi-
viduals interviewed in the Public Pulse VII survey 
about their choice of medical services, the majori-
ty (66 percent) reported that they sought treatment 
only in Kosovo (within the public or private sector). 
However, the preference for treatment abroad can be 
predicted by ethnicity, specifically among K-Serbs 
and dissatisfaction with the services provided at the 
University Clinical Centre in Prishtina/Priština; and 
medication/pharmacy costs. 
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7.3 Remittances and health
Research shows that migration and remittances con-
tribute to the health status of those left behind.130   
Monetary transfers or remittances can affect a fam-
ily’s health by relaxing liquidity constraints that 
would otherwise restrict access to health care.131
This seems to be the case also in Kosovo where ev-
idence suggests that up to 17 percent of total remit-
tances are allocated for health purposes.132 Families 
that receive remittances in Kosovo spend more on 
health care services than families that do not receive 
remittances.133 
Detailed analysis of available data as presented in 
the Statistical Annex to this report (p.81-83) indi-
cate that remittances are allocated to health costs 
and they seem to increase the health expenditure of 
those left behind although they are not associated 
with travel abroad for health services.  
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Key points – Chapters 6 & 7
• Simple descriptive statistics suggest that young people (16 –25 years old) are less likely to be in 
education if they are in a household that receives remittances.
• However, regression analysis shows that remittances do not affect the educational attendance of 
16-25 year olds when other determinants are properly considered. Instead, the number of people in 
the household, average age of all household members and average educational level of all family 
members were more powerful in predicting education attendance.
• Migration for educational purposes increased after 1999, especially among young people (25-35 
years old) and women.
• The educational attainment of migrants across different waves of migration improved in the coun-
try of migration (host country).
• Individuals from Kosovo consider medical treatment outside of Kosovo primarily because they are 
dissatisfied with services offered by Kosovo public health services or perceive that costs of medi-
cation are high. Kosovo-Serbs are especially likely to consider medical treatment outside Kosovo.
• Remittances appear to relax the budgetary constraints of families. Therefore households receiving 
remittances spend more on health expenditures compared to households that do not receive remit-
tances. 
CHAPTER 8
8. Civic engagement, 
social remittances and 
Diaspora participation 
The quality of governance in Kosovo is a key de-
terminant of the prospects for human development. 
Human mobility – including long-term migration, 
short-term travel abroad, and international linkages 
through migrant remittances – may affect the quali-
ty of governance in several ways. On the one hand, 
migrants often meet new and unfamiliar sets of val-
ues in their host countries transferring these to their 
families and friends back home in the form of ‘so-
cial remittances’.134 For example, members of the 
Kosovan Diaspora in Western Europe experience 
the benefits of transparent public administration and 
high-quality public services on a daily basis which 
may lead them and their family members in Kosovo 
to expect the same and to engage in the political pro-
cess to promote these values at home. 
On the other hand, it has been argued that remit-
tances allow governments to reduce the quality of 
public services. After all, households that receive 
remittances can purchase what once were public 
services and might therefore exert less pressure on 
politicians to use tax revenue for the public good. 
This theory has been used to rationalize the empir-
ical observation that countries that receive a large 
amount of remittances tend to have a lower quality 
of governance.135 
Against the background of these opposing hypothe-
ses, we investigate what determines the willingness 
of Kosovan residents and members of the Diaspo-
ra to engage in the political and social process in 
Kosovo and to support human development through 
donations of time and money. In Section 8.1 we 
analyse how social and political activism in Koso-
vo depends on whether individuals belong to remit-
tance-receiving households, have spent a significant 
time abroad, or have at least some travelling expe-
rience abroad. In 8.2, we discuss how the Diaspora 
is organised, how their members are integrated in 
host countries and societies, and how integration 
depends on the migrants’ education, migration gen-
eration, age, and other relevant variables, as well as 
their engagement in Kosovo. Finally, in Section 8.3, 
we examine the links between the migrants and their 
engagement in Kosovo and how this may potential-
ly affect the transfer of social remittances as an im-
portant element for human development.  
Our analysis in this Chapter is based on two data 
sources. In Section 8.1, we employ the 2012 UNDP 
Public Pulse dataset that includes particularly rich 
information on individuals’ social and political par-
ticipation while in Section 8.2 we rely on the 2011 
Kosovo Remittance Survey which is one of only a 
few sources of socioeconomic data on Kosovan mi-
grants living abroad. 
8.1 Mobility and civic 
engagement
People may become involved socially and polit-
ically in various ways, including voting in elec-
tions, taking part in protests, participating in public 
meetings or community projects initiated by local 
government, participating in organizations such as 
political parties, NGOs, citizens’ or neighbourhood 
groups, or other local or religious initiatives. Analy-
sis of available data shows that short-term migration 
is more likely to affect someone’s political and so-
cial involvement at home. Long term migration and 
living in a remittance receiving household do not 
seem to have such a significant effect in this regard. 
Figures 8.1 to 8.6 compare participation rates in var-
ious aspects of civic engagement among those who 
travel regularly and those who do not.  
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Figure 8.1: Intention to vote and travel 
experience abroad
Figure 8.2: Participation in projects implemented
by local governments according to 
previous experience travelling abroad 
Source: Public Pulse database, (2012)
Source: Public Pulse database, (2012)
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As can be seen apart from the likelihood to vote, 
regular travellers generally participate more in civic 
activities.   
In conclusion, people’s mobility seems to have 
varying impacts in their social and political partic-
ipation in the host country but when expressed in 
terms of their travelling abroad (not necessarily for 
a long time-period), rates of participation seem for 
the most part to be positively affected by the expe-
rience. 
8.2 Diaspora perspectives: 
organisation, integration in 
host countries, and 
engagement in Kosovo 
8.2.1 Diaspora Organisation 
The nature of Diaspora organisation136 has changed 
significantly since the end of the conflict. During the 
1990s the Diaspora was organised around branches 
of Kosovan political parties and humanitarian or-
ganisations that supported K-Albanian social and 
political activism both abroad and in Kosovo.137 The 
entire Kosovo Government was in exile throughout 
the 1990s, and was financed in part by a 3 percent 
income tax. Since the Kosovan Diaspora at the time 
had higher income levels than those at home, they 
played a significant role in financing the Kosovo 
Government in exile and in many cases their contri-
butions greatly surpassed the 3 percent income tax 
levy.138 
However, after 1999, the collective action of the 
1990s was slowly replaced by individualism and 
a focus on family life.  The associations that sup-
ported the liberation of Kosovo and humanitarian 
actions lost their “reason of being”.139 Today, most 
of the Diaspora considers that their current level of 
organisation is less satisfactory due to the opposing 
political groupings that emerged in Kosovo in the 
aftermath of the conflict.140 According to a report 
that surveyed 1,091 visitors randomly selected at 
border points on the eve of the New Year Holiday 
of 2006/2007, over half of the respondents declared 
that they are not a member of any Kosovo related 
association.141 Currently, the Kosovan Diaspora is 
not only less involved in political issues at home, 
it lacks the capacities and proper organization that 
could put pressure on the relevant institutions in 
Kosovo (i.e. Ministry of Diaspora) to deal with Di-
aspora related concerns.142 
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Figure 8.3: Engagement in political parties 
according to previous experience 
travelling abroad
Figure 8.4: Engagement in NGOs according to
previous experience travelling abroad
Figure 8.5: Participation in public discussion 
according to previous experience travelling 
abroad
Figure 8.6: Participation in community initiatives 
according to previous experience 
travelling abroad
Source: Public Pulse database, 2012
Source: Public Pulse database, 2012
Source: Public Pulse database, 2012
Source: Public Pulse database, 2012
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A total of 54 percent of the Kosovo Diaspora think 
that there should be better cooperation among the 
Diaspora clubs, Kosovo institutions and the NGOs; 
another 23 percent believe that the Diaspora clubs 
should be connected, while only 17 percent think 
that they should continue their engagement via po-
litical party factions.142 The latter is unsurprising 
given the clashes among various political groupings 
and the perceived problem of political clientelism.143
The establishment of a central or umbrella organ-
isation is seen by some as an opportunity to bring 
members of the Kosovan Diaspora together.144 
Kosovo’s institutions have taken a number of steps 
to remedy these challenges. A Cultural Centre for 
Diaspora has recently opened in Istanbul with simi-
lar plans for Switzerland, Germany, France, and the 
United States.145 In addition, a number of initiatives 
have recently been launched by the Government of 
Kosovo to stimulate Diaspora engagement and or-
ganisation146 the impact of which is yet to be ob-
served. 
8.2.2 Diaspora integration in host 
countries
Unlike the first wave of migrants, the current gen-
eration (many of them born in host countries) are 
better integrated and more often engaged in the so-
cio-political life of their host country.147 
In Switzerland, for instance, the impact of Kosovo 
migrants (one of the largest foreign communities in 
the country) on the political scene is increasing in 
the areas where their concentration is higher.148 
Some “Swiss Kosovans” have now been elected 
as regional representatives in cantonal institutions, 
which may represent a turning point in the political 
participation of Kosovo Albanians in the country.149 
In addition, Kosovo Albanians have begun to par-
ticipate in syndicalism and civil society life, as wit-
nessed in Bern where some participants have had 
leading positions in one of the main syndicalist or-
ganizations – UNIA.150  Research suggests that polit-
ical participation in host countries increases with the 
ability to speak the host country’s language, along 
with duration of stay, education back-home, connec-
tions to social networks and labour markets151 which 
as noted in Chapter 6 of this report are things that 
most of the new generation of Kosovo migrants en-
joy in their respective host countries.  As noted in 
Box 8.1, Ylfete Fanaj a recently elected member of 
the Diaspora in Switzerland, considers Kosovan cit-
izens’ involvement and further integration in Swit-
zerland as highly important.152 Osman Osmani, an-
other politically active Kosovan migrant, notes that 
the more people are integrated the more they run for 
public offices and other activities in the host coun-
tries. In Switzerland there are around 100 Kosovans 
who have run for offices either on municipal or can-
tonal level, and very soon they will also be potential 
candidates in both legislative and executive branch-
es at the federal level.154
8.2.3 Engagement in Kosovo
Before the declaration of independence in February 
2008, the main institution that dealt with the Dias-
pora in Kosovo was a department within the Minis-
try of Culture, Youth, Sports, and Non-Residential 
Issues. 
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Box 8.1: The case of Ylfete Fanaj – Kosovan 
socio-political activist in Switzerland
In 2011, Ylfete Fanaj was elected to the Parliament of the Canton of Lucerne, continuing a political 
career that started in the City council of Lucerne. She is one of the first Kosovo Albanians to have 
reached this level of political office in Switzerland. The Canton of Lucerne is considered to be a very 
conservative place and Ylfete says it is difficult to judge whether the Albanians living in the canton 
helped her gather the 3,925 votes that got her elected. In her campaign, she did not target Albanians 
specifically, but ran on her Social Democratic Party’s agenda.
Ylfete Fanaj was born in Prizren, Kosovo, in 1982. As the political situation in Kosovo deteriorated 
in the early 1990s, she moved to Switzerland with other members of her family to join her father 
who had gone there earlier as a seasonal worker. Ylfete quickly learned German and obtained her 
primary, secondary, and university level education in Switzerland. She earned her Bachelor’s degree 
at the University of Lucerne, and is now finishing her Master’s degree in Law at the same university 
(Ylfete Fanaj Web Biography).
Its mandate was to link networks of those that are 
not permanent residents in Kosovo, and to address 
the cultural needs of migrants and of returnees in 
Kosovo.155 In 2008, this department was trans-
formed into the Office for Diaspora and Migration 
under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s office.156
Since this did not significantly improve the relations 
between the Diaspora and Kosovo institutions, the 
Government of Kosovo established the Ministry of 
Diaspora in 2010 with a mandate to “preserv[e] and 
cultivat[e] […] national identity, language, culture 
and education of the Diaspora members and migra-
tion and their relations with institutions of Republic 
of Kosovo”.157 As noted above, Cultural Centres that 
enjoy diplomatic status and serve the Kosovo Dias-
pora are currently being established in several host 
countries.158 In addition, Municipal Liaison Offices 
and Municipal Officers for Diaspora Affairs have 
also been established in 29 municipalities across 
Kosovo.159
The recently created Assembly of the Albanians in 
Switzerland is an example of this new approach by 
the Kosovo Government toward the Diaspora. The 
Assembly has 100 members from different regions 
of Switzerland and has been involved successfully 
in projects with the Ministry of Diaspora in Kosovo 
and the Embassy of Kosovo in Geneva. It has also 
reacted against certain voices in Switzerland which 
have tried to attribute individual criminal acts com-
mitted by individual Kosovo Albanians to the entire 
Albanian community.160 
The Assembly consists of mostly young people, pre-
sumably second generation immigrants who were 
born and raised in Switzerland and whose profes-
sional background and social status enable them to 
act effectively as representatives of the Kosovo Al-
banian community.
In the last elections in Kosovo, just 1,042 Diaspo-
ra voters out of the around 300,000 eligible actu-
ally cast a vote.161 This is indicative of the fact that 
the current legislative framework in Kosovo makes 
it difficult for the Diaspora to vote.162 In addition 
and as witnessed during the last election process, 
those who wish to vote from abroad face cumber-
some procedures before they cast their ballot.163 The 
Ministry of Diaspora did, however, produce some 
recommendations on easing voting procedures for 
those willing to vote from abroad.
Ylfete Fanaj observes that facilitating the Diaspora 
to vote, should not be viewed merely as a token of 
appreciation for their past support during the strug-
gle for independence, but more importantly as an 
incentive for members of the Diaspora to remain so-
cially and politically involved in Kosovo.164 There-
fore, a more Diaspora voting friendly legislative 
framework and voting procedures, such as: enabling 
Diaspora members to vote in Kosovo embassies and 
consulates  with a plan for the future introduction of 
electronic voting could significantly increase voter 
outcome among the members of Diaspora. 
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Box 8.2: The case of Faton Topalli – A former member of 
Diaspora politically engaged in Kosovo
Faton Topalli was politically involved in Switzerland where he ran in cantonal elections of 2008 as a 
candidate of the Ecoliberal party in the Canton of Schaffhausen. Faton Topalli moved to Kosovo in 
2010 and since then he has been a member of left leaning Vetëvendosje, a political party in Koso-
vo that promotes social democratic policies. In the central elections of 2010, Faton was among the 
10 most voted for candidates in his political party which managed to get 12 out of 120 seats in the 
Kosovo parliament. Faton also ran for mayor of Ferizaj in extraordinary mayoral elections in April 
2012 and came in third with 16 percent of the votes. 
Faton Topalli was born in the village of Zllatar in 1963 and finished his primary and secondary edu-
cation in Ferizaj/ Uroševac, Kosovo. He was one of the political activists who organized demonstra-
tions in the early 1980s and fled Kosovo in 1981. He resided initially in Turkey and Germany and 
lived in Switzerland from1983. Faton obtained both his bachelor’s and master’s degrees in social 
sciences in Switzerland and has taught at the Zürcher Hochschule für Angewandte Wissenschaften 
– ZHAW as an adjunct lecturer since 2007. He returned to Kosovo because he believes that Kosovo 
needs his involvement more than Switzerland (F. Topalli, Email communication, August 5, 2013)
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This would inevitably engage them in decision mak-
ing processes and widen the channel through which 
experiences and knowledge about various policies 
that affect human development in general can flow.
Apart from political engagement in their country 
of origin, members of the Kosovo Diaspora have 
helped stimulate the “brain gain” from abroad. For 
instance, from 2002 to 2011, more than 70 Kosovo 
academics from abroad have given more than 140 
guest lectures at the University of Prishtina/Priština, 
through a project financed by WUS Austria.165  Al-
though the idea of this project was not to facilitate 
the permanent return of these academics, several of 
them have already permanently returned and con-
tinue to teach in both public and private sector edu-
cational institutions. Similarly, a number of Kosovo 
Diaspora professors and researchers from the Uni-
versity of Vienna have established the Department 
of Computer Sciences at a private college in Prishti-
na/Priština, where students are able to study soft-
ware engineering.166 From a business perspective, 
a number of Kosovans working for major global 
telecommunications companies established a highly 
specialized telecommunications company in Koso-
vo that provides services to telecommunications 
carriers around the globe.  Some of its founders also 
serve on its executive board.167  
8.3 Transfer of democratic 
values through Diaspora
It is often believed that after having spent a signif-
icant time abroad, especially in western developed 
liberal democracies, migrants often adopt their re-
spective host countries’ democratic values and help 
transfer them home. However, in Kosovo the pos-
itive impact of the political engagement of former 
members of the Diaspora especially in the post-con-
flict period is questionable. 
This is not to say that mobility, or the fact that they 
have spent significant time abroad has not helped 
the Diaspora transfer democratic values, rather the 
context in Kosovo has not actually allowed them to 
adopt those values, and thus make the desired im-
pact on socio-political life. Many political activists 
in the Diaspora, especially those from the genera-
tion of migrants in the 1980s and 1990s returned to 
Kosovo and continued their political activities back 
home. This includes the current Prime Minister and 
the head of PDK, Mr. Hashim Thaci among others. 
Despite their experiences of living in advanced 
Western democracies such as Germany or Swit-
zerland for extended periods of time, there is lit-
tle identifiable impact on the political process in 
Kosovo in terms of these returnees transferring 
democratic values. The Freedom House ‘Nations 
in Transit’ report (2004 to 2013) ranks Kosovo as a 
‘Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime’ with an 
average democracy score of 5.25 on a scale from 
1 to 7, where a score of 1 to 2 indicates a consol-
idated democracy and a score of 6 to 7 indicates a 
consolidated authoritarian regime.168 One likely ex-
planation for why democracy in Kosovo has not yet 
been fully established despite the large number of 
returnees in high office is that, while abroad, these 
political activists were mostly concerned with the 
struggle for independence in Kosovo and had little 
time to absorb democratic values and processes.169 
Moreover, many of these migrants received income 
support meaning that they did not have to work or 
integrate into the host societies as they were work-
ing to remedy problems at home especially during 
the 1990s. As such, they did not have the opportuni-
ty to be challenged by and to gain knowledge from 
institutions of western developed democracies. This 
has most likely affected the ability of these officials 
(at least the aforementioned generation) to transfer 
meaningful democratic values to their birthplace.
Given that younger generations and the migrants 
that are part of the latest immigration waves have 
a tendency to be more educated, there is potential 
for them to fundamentally transform the value sys-
tem in Kosovo. The involvement of Diaspora in de-
cision making does not serve only as a bridge be-
tween the birthplace and the host country, but it also 
helps transfer democratic values.170  That said many 
younger members of the Diaspora have started to 
view trips to Kosovo as both unnecessary and expen-
sive and they are beginning to find more attractive 
and cheaper destinations for summer holidays.171 
As can be seen in Figure 8.7, out of all 645 respon-
dents who were asked about the average length of 
stay in Kosovo during the Kosovo Remittance Sur-
vey in 2011, only 5 percent fall within the 18-24 
age group. More than half of the respondents, or 54 
percent, that visit Kosovo are between 37 and 65 
years old and the majority of them tend to stay from 
two weeks to one month. Moreover, focus group 
discussions in Switzerland and Kosovo confirmed 
that the cultural gap between the Diaspora and the 
non-migrant population in Kosovo is widening and 
both sides harbour many prejudices. 
While the local population blames Diaspora mem-
bers for portraying a bad image of Kosovo abroad 
and for “importing” negative behaviours from “the 
West”, members of the Diaspora are very critical 
about the “dependency” of their family members 
and the perceived incompetence of the local admin-
istration in Kosovo. In turn, local people blame Di-
aspora members for showing off their wealth during 
visits to Kosovo and thereby leading locals to ex-
pect more support, intensifying the dependency.172
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Figure 8.7: Duration of stay in Kosovo according
to age group
Source: UNDP - Kosovo Remittance household Survey database, 2011
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Key points – Chapter 8
• People’s mobility seems to have varying impacts on their social and political participation in the 
host country. Those who have travelled abroad at least once during the past 12 months are more 
likely to participate in activities organised by local government and more likely to be engaged with 
political parties as well as NGOs. They are also more likely to participate in public discussions and 
take part in community-based-initiatives such as religious and neighbourhood initiatives.
• During the pre-conflict period, because of poor social circumstances and overall social and political 
marginalisation that was present in Kosovo, the members of Diaspora were much better organ-
ised and as a result unified in order to tackle and deal with circumstances in the place of origin. 
Conversely, in the post-conflict period, the organisation of Diaspora was still a reflection of the 
circumstances in the country of origin and mainly a reflection of divisions within the political scene 
at home. 
• Considering the post-conflict changes in Diaspora organisation, Kosovo’s institutions have taken 
a number of steps to remedy the challenges. Kosovo’s Ministry of Diaspora has already opened a 
Cultural Centre in Istanbul and it plans to do the same in Switzerland, Germany, France, and the 
United States where the Kosovo Diaspora are predominantly located. Moreover, the Government of 
Kosovo has passed a regulation on drafting the register of migrants, associations, and other forms 
of their organisation, which among others shall include the number and geographic distribution of 
Diaspora and Migration; demographic structure; socio-economic characteristics of Diaspora house-
holds; and data for all the Diaspora associations, businesses, and other organisations.
• Members of the Kosovo Diaspora face many challenges when they decide to exercise their voting 
rights. For instance, in the last elections in Kosovo, out of around 300,000 eligible voters among 
the members of Diaspora, only 1,042 exercised their right to vote.
• Given that younger generations and the migrants that are part of the latest immigration waves have 
a tendency to be more educated, there is potential for them to be more integrated, and create a fun-
damental value transformation. The involvement of Diaspora in decision making serves not only 
as a bridge between the birthplace and the host country, but it also helps in transferring democratic 
values.
• The current generation of Diaspora, unlike the previous generations, tends to be organised more 
around professional and other interest groups, and thus, look less at their birthplace as a solution to 
their problems. 
CHAPTER 9
9. Policy 
recommendations: 
Enhancing the 
contribution of 
migration and 
remittances to human 
development in Kosovo
We have demonstrated in this report that interna-
tional labour migration and remittances contribute 
to human development in Kosovo in diverse and 
substantial ways. The Diaspora is large relative to 
the resident population and remittances along with 
other Diaspora-related reserve inflows are large in 
relation to Kosovo’s GDP. In this Chapter, we dis-
cuss the implications for policy interventions that 
may enhance the benefits of migration and remit-
tances, address possible risks and contribute to hu-
man development in Kosovo.
9.1 The limits of human 
development based on 
migration and remittances 
We start with an important caveat. Throughout this 
report, we have focused on how migration and re-
mittances contribute to human development. With-
out detracting from this important contribution, re-
searchers have also long argued that large inflows of 
remittances may pose a risk to good governance and 
therefore to human development in the long run.1 
For example, individuals who receive remittances 
depend less on the provision of public goods as re-
mittances afford them the opportunity to purchase 
(formerly free) government services (e.g., health). 
With high remittances, a new political economy 
equilibrium may arise where there is more corrup-
tion and less provision of government services, sti-
fling long-term economic growth. It will be import-
ant for Kosovo to avoid such a scenario. Sustainable 
income growth for Kosovo’s population in the long 
run cannot be based on remittances alone which are 
large and resilient to shocks, but unlikely to increase 
much more. While many Kosovans continue to emi-
grate and thereby expand their life choices, the high 
rates of unemployment and enforced economic in-
activity demonstrate that emigration is not a solu-
tion for everyone. Some households in Kosovo are 
lifted out of poverty by remittances, but others re-
main in poverty. 
Sustainable economic growth and human develop-
ment thus require a sustained growth of output – e.g. 
Gross Domestic Product – as well as the effective 
provision of social assistance, education, and health 
care by the authorities. 
As a precondition for economic growth in the con-
text of a small, post-conflict economy, Kosovo needs 
to be integrated closely into European and global 
markets for goods, services, capital, and labour. For 
trade in goods, such integration is still hampered by 
Kosovo’s land-locked geographic location and dif-
ficult relationship with Serbia. New transport links 
such as the highway to Albanian seaports provide 
relief as they become operational. Initially, invest-
ment in Kosovo will be particularly attractive in 
sectors that: 
• process raw materials that would otherwise be 
exported from Kosovo; 
• produce goods that can substitute for products 
that are currently imported; or 
• provide services (including IT-related) where 
transport costs do not matter. 
Investment and output growth are not only impeded 
by high international transaction costs. The business 
environment in Kosovo is still challenging for many 
domestic and foreign investors and hence a bottle-
neck for investment-driven, job-creating growth. 
Potential investors include migrants and recipients 
of remittances who may have funds to invest but 
currently face numerous uncertainties. Since the 
business climate will not improve overnight or by 
government fiat, it will be crucial in the short run to 
identify public and private investment projects that 
already work well, and to build on these experiences. 
On-going efforts by the Kosovo authorities to gather 
and disseminate information on investment oppor-
tunities in Kosovo to all potential investors – inter-
national, Diaspora, or domestic – are commendable. 
In the medium to long run however, rule of law and 
good governance of public policies remain key con-
ditions for sustainable economic growth and human 
development. 
Furthermore, Kosovo institutions and the private 
sector should consider how to use the Kosovo mi-
grants and Diaspora on one hand for access to (inter-
national) markets, and on the other hand as ambas-
sadors for Kosovo products and exports of services 
through activities such as international fairs, cultur-
al events and by creation of Associations with Dias-
pora Businesses. 
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9.2 Specific policy areas: 
social welfare, education, 
health (-care)
Targeted policy interventions are also required to 
protect vulnerable groups from poverty and promote 
human capital formation through universal access to 
education and health care. 
In the area of social welfare, it is crucial that the 
government bear the responsibility to provide social 
protection to all the citizens of Kosovo, especially 
the most vulnerable groups, including single moth-
ers, children, ethnic minorities, people with disabili-
ties, the long-term unemployed, and the elderly. Cur-
rently, Kosovo’s social protection system is limited 
in coverage and does not include an unemployment 
benefit. Although some politically popular benefits 
(old-age pensions, transfers to armed conflict vet-
erans and people with disabilities), were increased 
by 25% in April 2014, the only benefit targeting to 
poor families - the Social Assistance Scheme – has 
not been increased since 2003 and is insufficient to 
cover even the minimum food needs of beneficia-
ries.2  While the latest (2012) amendments to the 
legislation on social assistance include a small in-
crease in child benefits, they also narrow the ben-
eficiary base. Moreover, social and especially care 
services offered at both local and central level are 
often of low quality and are not integrated with em-
ployment services and social transfers for effective 
social inclusion of the most vulnerable and excluded 
individuals. 
      
In the field of education (Chapter 6), our empiri-
cal findings reveal some uncertainty as to the pol-
icy-relevance of the observation that education at-
tendance among young people between the ages of 
16 and 25 years is somewhat lower in households 
that receive remittances. Our regression analysis 
suggests that this relationship is not robust if plausi-
ble control variables such as household size and the 
education level of adults in the household are taken 
into account. More research is needed to determine 
the strength of this relationship. However, it remains 
a cause for concern that the education system is less 
attractive for those young people with more financial 
means and potentially better employment prospects 
abroad. Against the background of very high youth 
unemployment, Kosovo needs an education system 
that provides students with a good general education 
(including in foreign languages and soft skills such 
as communication, creative problem solving, strate-
gic thinking, team building and the like that are in 
high demand by the private sector) and vocational 
training opportunities to generate a high return on 
the time spent in education. Kosovo’s youth need to 
have skills that are relevant for work both in Kosovo 
and abroad because the economy of  Kosovo may 
not be able to provide jobs for all young people en-
tering the labour market during the coming years.
The skills that are provided in the current higher ed-
ucation and vocational training system do not match 
global labour market needs; nor are they in accor-
dance with the needs of Kosovo’s labour market. 
Therefore, reform of the education system should 
start by identifying the professions as well as skills 
and abilities that are in short supply compared to 
the demands of the private sector. In the short term, 
public higher education institutions should invest in 
staff and facilities for programmes such as Natural 
Sciences and Applied Engineering and Information 
Technology. To date, most migrants from Kosovo 
were low skilled individuals who worked in the con-
struction, hospitality and catering, and similar sec-
tors in European countries. 
Therefore, in the long term, considering its young 
population, Kosovo should explore the means 
through which it can supply highly skilled labour 
to the global market, in correspondence with devel-
opments in the information and technology sectors. 
Young women in Kosovo’s rural areas are still less 
likely to attend university than young men, probably 
due in part to perceptions and expectations related 
to traditional gender roles. As the provision of equal 
opportunities to all is an important aspect of human 
development, Kosovo authorities, with donor sup-
port, may wish to consider measures that encourage 
young women to attend university either in Kosovo 
or abroad. Possible interventions include scholar-
ships for women in subjects where they are partic-
ularly under-represented or other forms of support 
(such as mentoring by female leaders in specific 
professional areas).
Many students from Kosovo attend universities 
abroad. Kosovo students and those from the Dias-
pora who have post-graduate degrees should be en-
couraged to return (both for the short and long term) 
as academics or researchers in public and private 
universities. The Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology may wish to consider establishing 
a web portal where students abroad could register, 
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providing information about where they are, what 
subjects they study, degrees obtained, research in-
terests and other relevant information. 
Such a web portal would help facilitate the estab-
lishment of job fairs whereby private and public 
sector employers could get information on skills 
and contact details of graduates for possible en-
gagement both for short-term assignments and lon-
ger term employment. This information would also 
underpin government policies in areas such as stra-
tegic planning for developing the university system 
in Kosovo and measures to deepen links between 
students abroad and Kosovo. The latter may include 
internships in Kosovo for either students abroad or 
Diaspora students; student exchange programmes 
(Erasmus-style) for Kosovo students and for inter-
national or Diaspora students; or long-term scholar-
ships for Kosovo students abroad. Simultaneously, 
the students attending graduate and doctorate pro-
grammes in universities abroad should be encour-
aged to conduct (especially empirical) research on 
relevant policy areas for Kosovo to support evi-
dence-based policymaking. For instance, the min-
istries and municipalities could use the web portal 
to publish requests for research on thematic areas 
where evidence to draft policies or strategic plans 
is lacking. Collaborative relationships such as this 
could help enhance various levels of government 
whilst also providing good experience and exposure 
to young students. The latter is especially important 
and could attract young professionals to work for 
Kosovan institutions in the future.  
Promotion of student exchange programmes (e.g. 
Erasmus) is highly desirable.  However, pro-
grammes of this nature should not be limited to uni-
versity students. Vocational and professional train-
ing opportunities in Kosovo need to be expanded 
(see above) and exchange programmes for students 
in vocational training and for young workers could 
be helpful in this regard. The existing opportunities 
for vocational training abroad provided by at least 
one international Chamber of Commerce in Kosovo 
should be evaluated with a view to their possible 
scalability. For those young people with limited for-
eign language skills, exchange programmes might 
involve members of the Diaspora who could facil-
itate inter-cultural learning. By building contacts 
between potential investors abroad and Kosovo vo-
cational students, future investment projects could 
also be facilitated. 
In the area of health(-care) policy, it is imperative 
that access to basic health care of decent quality 
should not be limited to those who can afford large 
private co-payments (whether due to remittances 
or not). At present, the healthcare system in Koso-
vo does not provide sufficient high quality tertia-
ry healthcare services so that many Kosovans go 
abroad for more complicated treatment or surgery. 
Travelling abroad to obtain medical care is inherent-
ly stressful to patients and costly to families. Kosovo 
authorities should continue to gradually expand the 
range of medical services offered in Kosovo whilst 
also facilitating treatment abroad when needed, for 
example through contracts with particular hospitals, 
provision of accommodation for family members 
accompanying patients, etc. 
It is important that Kosovo public and private health 
institutions should look for possible ways to incen-
tivise the Diaspora health practitioners to provide 
these services in Kosovo. This way, the treatment 
costs for patients and their families as well as the 
government will be lower. Simultaneously, this 
would provide an opportunity for transfers of skills 
and knowledge from Diaspora practitioners to their 
local colleagues in Kosovo.  In this regard, the effort 
of the Ministry of Diaspora to establish Associations 
of Diaspora experts including medical practitioners 
who are willing to come to Kosovo and transfer 
their expertise is highly valued. The ongoing Regis-
tration of Diaspora undertaken by the Ministry is an 
additional and important initiative that will facilitate 
the identification of a wide range of experts who are 
willing to contribute to Kosovo’s development.  
Considering that the provision of high-quality med-
ical care is subject to pervasive economies of scale, 
another option for Kosovo would be to further 
strengthen regional cooperation with neighbouring 
countries in the provision of highly specialised treat-
ments. The Ministry of Health has recently signed 
bilateral agreements to facilitate skills transfer with 
countries such as Turkey which involve the organi-
sation of events such as “Health weeks Kosovo-Tur-
key”, through which Kosovan physicians had the 
opportunity to observe surgeries and other complex 
procedures. Similar initiatives should be replicated 
with other countries in the region as they are of sig-
nificant merit. Diaspora members are beginning to 
use certain healthcare services (such as dental care) 
in Kosovo where quality service is provided at low-
er prices than elsewhere in Europe.
Opportunities for the provision of similar, additional 
services should be explored because an expansion 
of healthcare tourism in Kosovo, would benefit not 
only the Diaspora, but also the local population 
through spillover effects.
9.3 Strengthening Diaspora 
links with Kosovo
In this report, we have dealt with the (mostly bene-
ficial) effects of financial remittances on households 
as well as with “social remittances” – i.e. the chang-
es in values, attitudes, and behaviour among Kosovo 
residents that result from emigrants being exposed 
to another culture, adopting new cultural norms, and 
transferring them back to Kosovo residents (Chapter 
8). In addition, international experience shows that 
some high-emigration countries receive “collective 
remittances” – i.e. financial or in-kind contributions 
from migrants to community projects. A variety 
of policy interventions – ranging from symbolic 
to practical – may help to enhance the Diaspora’s 
sense of identification with Kosovo and promote 
private, social, and collective remittances. Strength-
ening links with the Diaspora takes on added im-
portance as many emigrants, especially among the 
second generation, are becoming well-integrated in 
their host countries. The intensity of their links with 
Kosovo will increasingly depend on whether they 
will accept the challenge of leading “transnational” 
lives – being fully integrated in their host countries 
while maintaining close links with Kosovo.
The Kosovo government may be able to support 
Diaspora activities that make trans-nationality more 
attractive, such as cultural events abroad, support for 
the teaching of Albanian to second-generation emi-
grants, etc. The on-going establishment of Kosovo 
cultural centres by the Ministry of Diaspora3  in ma-
jor European cities is a useful step in this direction.4 
In running the centres, it will be important to en-
sure that their activities cater to the needs of a broad 
range of emigrants and that Diaspora members play 
a leading role in running the centres. While many 
activities (such as language courses) can probably 
be self-financing, it is useful for the Kosovo author-
ities that are in charge of diplomatic missions to act 
as catalyst by setting up the centres. 
Several recent initiatives by the Ministry of Dias-
pora promise to usefully complement the establish-
ment of cultural centres. Networking activities for 
prominent Diaspora members and Kosovo represen-
tatives such as the planned Conference for Kosovan 
(Albanian) Diaspora to be held in Prishtina/Priština 
may help to establish the personal contacts that form 
the basis of all successful cooperations. 
The National Council of the K-Albanian Diaspora, 
to be established after the ongoing process of found-
ing professional networks has been concluded, will 
formally involve Diaspora representatives in the de-
sign of Diaspora-related policies and thereby make 
these policies more effective. Similarly, the planned 
creation of a network of expert advisors on migra-
tion and Diaspora may enhance the quality of the 
policy-making process and will help to mainstream 
migration into Kosovo’s development agenda.5 The 
Kosovo authorities’ National Strategy for Diaspora 
2013-20186  establishes a useful framework to de-
velop all these policies further. The willingness of 
Diaspora members to spend time and money to sup-
port the social and economic development of Koso-
vo (collective remittances) will depend on whether 
they feel that their efforts are effective and valued 
by the authorities. 
How effectively collective remittances are used de-
pends in large measure on the quality of governance 
of public policies in general. As we have already 
pointed out when we discussed the investment cli-
mate in Kosovo (Section 9.1), good governance and 
the rule of law are preconditions for sustainable eco-
nomic growth and human development. 
A sense of appreciation for the Diaspora’s role in 
Kosovo may be conveyed by giving the Diaspora a 
formal representation in Kosovo’s parliament. Hav-
ing a formal role in the policy-making process could 
assure Diaspora members that their views are taken 
into account/consideration and their contributions 
of time and money valued. Since several ethnic mi-
norities in Kosovo are already guaranteed a fixed 
number of seats in parliament, there is a precedent 
that could also be applied to the Diaspora. Howev-
er, since emigrants do not live in Kosovo and do 
not pay taxes, they are, for the most part, much less 
affected by legislative decisions so their represen-
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3 http://medrks-gov.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Law-on-diaspora-and-migration.pdf (20.07.2014).
4 http://medrks-gov.net/cultural-centers/?lang=en (24.07.2014).
5 cf. Point 6 on the Agenda for Action, High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, 3-4 October 2013.
6 http://medrks-gov.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Shqip-Strategjia-per-Diasporen-dhe-plani-i-veprimit-versioni-i-aprovuar-ne-Qeveri.pdf (10.07.2014).
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tation in parliament should be highly visible but ul-
timately symbolic: Diaspora representation in par-
liament should correspond to how members of the 
Diaspora are involved in and affected by Kosovo 
affairs. These considerations apply particularly to 
Kosovo-wide elections. 
To promote collective remittances, many high-em-
igration countries have successfully implemented 
financing schemes for community investment proj-
ects that match private contributions by migrants 
or domestic households with government or donor 
funds. In addition to attracting international reserve 
flows, such schemes may also allow migrants to 
bring their managerial and technical skills to bear on 
community projects and to enforce high standards 
for the transparent use of their contributions. Sim-
ilarly, there are many examples of Diaspora mem-
bers working pro bono to contribute their special 
professional skills to public projects that promote 
socio-economic development, including university 
education and specialised medical services. Govern-
ment and donor support for such initiatives would 
be appropriate.
Similar to the web portal that we have suggested for 
Kosovo students abroad (Section 9.2 above), a web 
portal for experts from the Diaspora to register their 
skills and availability for either pro bono or paid 
work could be developed. This would be one deriv-
ative of the Diaspora Registry that is currently being 
implemented by the Ministry of Diaspora.7 Given 
the large number of international experts working in 
Kosovo (from physicians who conduct difficult sur-
geries to economic consultants), it would be useful 
to ensure that Diaspora members are aware of these 
opportunities because they are particularly likely to 
cooperate effectively with Kosovo residents and to 
build durable professional relationships given their 
knowledge of the local language and traditional 
norms and values. 
9.4 Creating more 
opportunities for legal 
migration and mobility
Since Kosovo’s integration into European and glob-
al markets for goods and (to a lesser extent) services 
faces natural and political obstacles and will only 
proceed slowly (Section 9.1), labour migration will 
remain a key dimension of Kosovo’s integration 
into the European and global economy. At present, 
however, there are few legal migration opportuni-
ties other than family unification, studying abroad 
for those with the right qualifications and financial 
means, and jobs for some categories of high-skilled 
workers. Additional legal employment opportuni-
ties, particularly in Europe, would benefit not only 
the new emigrants, but would also help to allevi-
ate unemployment and poverty and promote human 
development in Kosovo more broadly (as we have 
explained in Chapter 3).
Apart from long-term employment, even short-term 
travel to EU member states is often difficult for 
Kosovo residents because they still need a visa to 
enter the Schengen Area even for short stays. At the 
same time, Kosovo residents depend crucially on 
travel to the EU for better access to education and 
health care and to facilitate a wide variety of inter-
national economic transactions. Visa requirements 
generate unnecessary transaction costs and reduce 
the welfare particularly of those who depend most 
on international mobility. The authorities of Koso-
vo should work energetically to make progress on 
the implementation of the road map for visa liberal-
isation laid down by the EU to achieve the import-
ant milestone of visa-free short-term travel to the 
Schengen Area.
  7 http://www.kosovodiaspora.org/?page_id=537 (04.07.2014).
Key points – Chapter 9
• Caveat 1: Migration and remittances, in and of themselves, will not lead to sustainable economic 
growth and human development in the medium to long run. Good governance of public policies 
and the rule of law are crucial for improving the investment climate and laying the foundation for 
sustained growth of output and incomes. 
• Caveat 2:  Targeted social assistance is needed to ensure that vulnerable individuals do not fall into 
poverty; education and health care need to be provided and financed in ways that make them acces-
sible to all. Remittances cannot be relied upon to provide for all individuals in need. 
• To make it easier for members of the Diaspora to maintain links with Kosovo while becoming 
fully integrated in their host countries, Kosovo authorities may implement a variety of measures 
that would facilitate maintaining links. Cultural centres abroad, networking events for prominent 
Diaspora members and Kosovo representatives, and the planned National Council of K-Albanian 
Diaspora may all help to strengthen Diaspora members’ identification with Kosovo. To ensure wide 
involvement by the Diaspora, members of the Diaspora should play a key role in implementation 
of these activities. 
• To convey a sense of appreciation for the contribution of the Diaspora to Kosovo’s economic and 
social development, the Diaspora could be represented in the Kosovo parliament through reserved 
seats, similar to ethnic minorities. 
• There is scope for extending exchange programmes for university as well as vocational students. 
These may involve summer internships in Kosovo for Diaspora and Kosovo students at universities 
abroad; periods of study abroad (Erasmus style) for Kosovo students and vice versa; or long-term 
scholarships for study abroad if recipients commit to working for Kosovo authorities after their 
studies. 
• Diaspora contributions to social and economic development projects in Kosovo could be facilitat-
ed, with donor assistance, through matching funds from donors or other support. Involvement by 
Diaspora experts in Kosovo in areas like teaching, research, technological or business consulting, 
be it pro bono or paid, should be encouraged.
• Kosovo’s enhanced progress would be greatly facilitated by more opportunities for labour migra-
tion and mobility throughout Europe. Potential host countries should consider creating additional 
opportunities for labour migration from Kosovo. To facilitate international mobility for study, work, 
medical treatment, and leisure, Kosovo authorities should energetically implement the roadmap set 
by the EU for visa liberalisation. 
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Statistical 
Annex
a. statistical  tables
These Tables correspond to the content of the report 
captured in chapters 2-8.
* Source: Authors’ estimations are based on UNDP (2011) data.
Coefficient t P>|t|
Amount of Remittances 12.87 7.31 0.00
Household Income 
without remittances 
included
0.02 5.63 0.00
Peja/Peć 22.4 9.45 0.00
Ferizaj/ Uroševac -6.77 -2.87 0.00
Gjakova/Đakovica -14.36 -5.36 0.00
Gjilan/Gnjilane 13.7 5.9 0.00
Prizreni 24.34 10.49 0.00
Mitrovica 15.15 8.03 0.00
Average years of 
completed education 5.52 12.34 0.00
Dependency ratio -4.36 -2.84 0.01
Household heads that 
have completed tertiary 
education
3.37 1.79 0.07
Household size -5.8 -10.85 0.00
Rural -2.89 -2.16 0.03
Male Head of Household 0.91 0.47 0.64
Working adult 15.9 10.19 0.00
Constant 33.49 5.62 0.00
Coefficient t P>|t|
Amount of Remittances 2.21 5.36 0.00
Household Income without 
remittances included 0.00 0.3 0.76
Peja/Peć 3.25 6.31 0.00
Ferizaj/ Uroševac 0.78 1.81 0.07
Gjakova/Đakovica -2.42 -4.92 0.00
Gjilan/Gnjilane -0.35 -0.61 0.55
Prizreni 0.19 0.42 0.68
Mitrovica 0.24 0.64 0.52
Average years of completed 
education -0.3 -3.1 0.00
Elderly Share 12.42 8.57 0.00
Household heads that have 
completed tertiary 
education
0.37 0.99 0.32
Household size -0.47 -5.34 0.00
Rural 0.39 1.39 0.17
Male Head of Household -1.13 -2.46 0.01
Working adult -0.36 -1.23 0.22
Constant 11.11 7.57 0.00
Coefficient t P>|t|
Amount of Remittances 0.00 3.00 0.00
Household Income without 
remittances included 3.97 8.81 0.00
Peja/Peć 1.92 4.15 0.00
Ferizaj/ Uroševac -0.10 -0.17 0.86
Gjakova/Đakovica 2.67 6.87 0.00
Gjilan/Gnjilane 7.46 14.98 0.00
Prizreni 6.52 17.95 0.00
Mitrovica 0.77 9.10 0.00
Average years of completed 
education 0.89 2.10 0.04
Household heads that 
have completed tertiary 
education
-0.01 -0.15 0.88
Household size 0.54 1.92 0.05
Rural 0.23 0.57 0.57
Male Head of Household -0.24 -0.78 0.44
Working adult -8.18 -8.33 0.00
Constant -8.18 -8.33 0.00
Coefficient t P>|t|
Amount of Remittances 0.005 3.05 0.002
Peja/Peć 0.052 1.89 0.059
Ferizaj/ Uroševac 0.110 2.70 0.007
Gjakova/Đakovica -0.005 -0.2 0.838
Gjilan/Gnjilane 0.039 1.28 0.199
Mitrovica -0.016 -0.8 0.425
Prizreni 0.025 0.95 0.343
Household heads that have 
completed tertiary educa-
tion
-0.017 -1.2 0.23
Household size 0.007 2.86 0.004
Total income 0.000 1.94 0.053
Rural 0.036 3.16 0.002
Average years of completed 
education -0.005 -1.54 0.123
OLS Regression results: Consumption per adult 
equivalent* 
OLS Regression results: Health expenditure per 
adult equivalent*
OLS Regression results: Education expenditure 
per adult equivalent*
OLS Regression results: Education expenditure 
per adult equivalent*
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Considering 
treatment 
abroad as 
choice (yes/no)
Explanatory variables Odds ratios
Gender
Default- Men
Women 0.929
Age 0.985
Education 0.983
Employment status
Default -Unemployed 
Employed 0.909
Marital status
Default - not married 
Married 1.114
Ethnicity
Default - K -Albanians 
K-Serbs 1.201*
Other 0.441
Number of visits per 12 months 1.006
Income 1.002
Satisfaction with family medicine centers
Default - Yes
No 2.194
Satisfaction with UCCP
Default - Yes
No 3.596*
Satisfaction with hospitals 
Default - Yes
No 0.521
Costs at Public Health Care Services 1.001
Pharmacy/ education Costs 1.002*
Travelling
abroad 
for health 
purposes (within 
12 months) 
Explanatory variables Odds ratios
Gender
Default- Women
Men 0.175*
Age 
Default: 18-24
25-35 2.4
36-47 2.058
>48 18.61*
Education 1.082
Employment status
Default -Unemployed 
Employed 3.078
Marital status
Default - not married 
Married 1.338
Ethnicity
Default - K -Albanians 
K-Serbs 13.438**
Other 5.067
Area
Default Urban 
Rural 0.868
Personal income 0.997
Remittance recipients
Default - No 
Yes 0.952
Last month
spent money
on health 
purposes
(YES/NO)
Amount in
EUROS spent 
last month for 
health
purposes
Explanatory variable Odds ratio Beta
(S.E.) (S.E.)
Receiving remittances 1.227** 3.576**
-0.062 -0.328
(default - no) 
Household characteristics 
Number of adults between 15 and 65 
years old 
1.072** 1.073**
-0.019 -0.097
Mean years of completed education 
of all household members above 18 
0.949** -2.352
-0.016 -0.076
Number of people not working in 
family
1.037 1.767*
-0.042 -0.181
Region 
Rural 1.626** -0.772
-0.056 (0.02) 
(default - urban) 
Economic situation 
Amount of money spent on food 1.002 0.070**
-0.02 -0.003
Amount of money spent on education 0.999 0.089**
-0.015 -0.003
Individual characteristics 
Gender 
Female 1.089 1.826
-0.055 -0.002
(default - male) 
Age 1.009** 0.139**
-0.002 -0.003
Number of observations 6016 6015
regression models for health expenditures*
Binary logistic regression for 
considering health treatment abroad (yes/no)*
Binary logistic regression for 
considering health treatment abroad (yes/no)*
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Logit model for educational attendance of men
and women aged [16- 18] and [19-25]* 
Age 16- 18 Age 19-25 
Odds ratio (S.E) Odds ratio (S.E)
Explanatory variable Men Women Men Women 
Remittances - yes 0.164 1.434 0.873 1.083
-1.058 -1.038 -0.188 -0.196
(default - no) 
Household characteristics 
Number of adults between 15 and 65 years old 2.739** 5.069** 0.832** 0.789**
-0.358 -0.623 -0.064 -0.067
Number of people working in household 0.322* 0.476 1.152 1.280**
-0.507 -0.813 -0.103 -0.102
Number of people not working in the household 1.688 3. 575 1.129 1.356*
-0.53 -1.19 -0.126 -0.14
Average age of all household members 1.165** 1.366* 0.98 1
-0.055 -0.096 -0.014 -0.014
Mean years of education for all household members above 18 1.383* 1.828** 1.160** 1.152**
-0.147 -0.301 -0.05 -0.059
Area of residence
Urban 1.195  0.872 0.803  1.027
-0.556 -0.992 -0.166 -0.178
(default - rural) 
Economic situation 
Amount of money spent on education 0.995 1.007 1.005** 1.001
-0.003 -0.022 -0.004 -0.002
Savings 2.695 0.947* 0.999 0.988
-0.011 -0.021 -0.002 -0.002
Transportation 1.082 1.029 0.999 1.001
-0.846 -0.027 -0.002 -0.003
Household gender 
Men 1.082 7.259 1.057 0.747
-0.846 -1.341 -0.239 -0.249
(default - Women) 
Employment 
Employed 0.774 0.096 1.38 1.494
-1.272 -2.674 -0.203 -0.262
(default - not employed) 
Number of observations 382 365 696 574
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b. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
INDEX FOR KOSOVO
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary 
measure of key dimensions of human development. 
It measures the average achievements in a country 
in three basic dimensions of human development: 
a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a 
decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric 
mean of normalised indices from each of these three 
dimensions. For a full elaboration of the method 
and its rationale, see Klugman, Rodriguez and Choi 
(2011). This technical note describes the steps used 
to calculate the HDI, data sources and the method-
ology used to express income.
  
Steps used to calculate the HDI 
There are two steps to calculating the HDI.  
Step 1. Creating the dimension indices  
Minimum and maximum values (goalposts) are set 
in order to transform the indicators into indices be-
tween 0 and 1. The maximums are the highest ob-
served values in the time series (1980–2012). The 
minimum values can be appropriately conceived of 
as subsistence values. The minimum values are set 
at 20 years for life expectancy, at 0 years for both 
education variables and at $100 for per capita gross 
national income (GNI). The low value for income 
can be justified by the considerable amount of un-
measured subsistence and nonmarket production in 
economies close to the minimum, not captured in 
the official data.
Goalposts for the Human Development Index in 
this Report  
Dimension Observed 
maximum 
Minimum 
Life expectancy 83.6
(Japan, 2012) 
20.0 
Mean years of 
schooling 
13.3
(United States, 2010) 
0
Expected years of 
schooling 
18.0 
(capped at) 
0 
Combined education 
index 
0.971
(New Zealand, 2010) 
0
Per capita income 
(PPP $) 
87,478
(Qatar, 2012) 
100
Having defined the minimum and maximum values, 
the subindices are calculated as follows: 
For education, equation 1 is applied to each of the 
two subcomponents, then a geometric mean of the 
resulting indices is created and finally, equation 1 is 
reapplied to the geometric mean of the indices using 
0 as the minimum and the highest geometric mean 
of the resulting indices for the time period under 
consideration as the maximum. This is equivalent to 
applying equation 1 directly to the geometric mean 
of the two subcomponents.
Because each dimension index is a proxy for capa-
bilities in the corresponding dimension, the trans-
formation function from income to capabilities is 
likely to be concave (Anand and Sen 2000). 
Human 
Development
Index (Hdi)
DIMENSIONS
INDICATORS
DIMENSION 
INDEX
Long and healthy life
Life expectancy at birth
Life expectancy
Knowledge
Human Development Index (HDI)
Mean years of schooling      Expected years of schooling
Education Index
A decent standard of living
GNI per capita (PPP US$)
GNI Index
actual value – minimum value (1) Life expectancy index =  maximum value – minimum 
Technical Note: Calculating the Human Development Index - Graphical presentation
3 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40810.0
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Thus, for income the natural logarithm minimum 
and maximum values is used.  
Step 2. Aggregating the subindices to produce the 
Human Development Index  
The HDI is the geometric mean of the three dimen-
sion indices: 
(I
Life
1/3 . IEducation1/3 . IIncome1/3).
Kosovo  
Indicator  Value 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 76.75 
Mean years of schooling (years) 10.71 
Expected years of schooling (years) 14.22 
GNI per capita (PPP US$) 9,446 
(76.75-20) = 0.895Life expectancy index = (83.6-20)
(10.41-0) = 0.783Mean years of schooling index = (13.3-0)
(14.21-0) = 0.789Expected years of schooling index = (18-0)
√0.783 . 0.789 – 0 =  0.809Education index = 0.971 – 0
ln(9446.13,2) – ln(100,2) = 0.671Income index = ln(87478,2) – ln(100,2)
3
Human Development Index = √0.809 . 0.895 . 0.671 = 0.786
Data sources
• Mean years of schooling index: Remittance 
study 2012
• Expected years of schooling index: CENSUS 
2012
• GNI (per capita) was calculated as: (GNDI (per 
capita) + GDP (per capita))/2
• GNDI (per capita) and GDP per capita: IMF
• Life expectancy at birth: KAS
Methodology used to express 
income 
GNI is traditionally expressed in current monetary 
terms. To make GNI comparable across time, GNI is 
converted from current to constant terms by taking 
the value of nominal GNI per capita in purchasing 
power parity (PPP) terms for the base year (2005) 
and building a time series using the growth rate of 
real GNI per capita, as implied by the ratio of cur-
rent GNI per capita in local currency terms to the 
GDP deflator.
Official PPPs are produced by the International 
Comparison Program (ICP), which periodically 
collects thousands of prices of matched goods and 
services in many countries. The last round of this 
exercise refers to 2005 and covers 146 countries. 
The 2011 round will produce new estimates by the 
end of 2013. The World Bank produces estimates 
for years other than the ICP benchmark based on 
inflation relative to the United States. Because other 
international organizations such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) quote 
the base year in terms of the ICP benchmark, the 
HDRO does the same. To obtain the income value 
for 2012, IMF-projected GDP growth rates (based 
on growth in constant terms) are applied to the most 
recent GNI values. The IMF-projected growth rates 
are calculated in local currency terms and constant 
prices rather than in PPP terms. This avoids mixing 
the effects of the PPP conversion with those of the 
real growth of the economy.
Estimating missing values 
For a small number of countries that were missing 
one out of four indicators, the HDRO estimated the 
missing value using cross-country regression mod-
els. The details of the models used are available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/understanding/is-
sues/. 
In this report the Policy, Research, Gender and 
Communication Team from UNDP Kosovo Office 
filled the gap by estimating the missing value using 
cross-country regression models. For example, the 
PPP conversion rates for Kosovo have been estimat-
ed as the average of Macedonia and Albania. The 
Table below shows Kosovo HDI with its compo-
nents from 2013. 
K
os
ov
o 
H
D
I 2
01
3
Human 
Develop-
ment Index 
(HDI) 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
(years)
Mean 
years of 
schooling
Expected 
years of 
schooling
Gross 
National 
Income 
(GNI) per 
capita
0.786
76.7 
(KAS,
2013)
10.7
(Remit-
tance 
survey, 
2013)
14.2 
(Remit-
tance 
survey, 
2013)
9,446 
(IMF, 
2013)3 
3 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40810.0
Note: Values are rounded.   
c. Methodological Note: 
Human Development index 
for Kosovo ON a Municipal
 basis
The Human Development Index was proposed back 
in 1990 in the first ever Global Development Report. 
The Index was really simple, but is intention was 
quite ambitious—to shift the global development 
debate from its narrow focus of economic perfor-
mance, measured by GDP, to the more comprehen-
sive measure of human progress. Over the last few 
decades the HDI has been recognised as an import-
ant, comprehensive and useful measure of progress. 
However, national level indicators are only useful 
for international comparisons, they cannot indicate 
the specific problems and priorities of a country. 
Domestic policy-making requires the disaggrega-
tion of these national level indicators to reveal their 
kind of intranational distribution. The global HDR 
attributes one average value of a composite index to 
all individuals living within a country. It indicates 
the “representative” individual. This average is with 
respect to education, life expectancy at birth and an 
average income independent of age. Since the indi-
vidual has an income, she or he must be an adult. 
This representative adult, however, has no occupa-
tion, no sex and lives everywhere in the country. 
The reality is that individuals within a country are 
not all identical.
Locality, community and living environment are 
some of the main factors, which shape our lives. 
Therefore, it is no surprise that geographical disag-
gregation is one of the most frequent and most im-
portant approaches to measure human development. 
Disaggregated at sub-national level or for different 
groups HDI could show how (and why) different 
administrative units or groups within a country 
stand vis-à-vis each other, what the strengths and 
weaknesses are and hence what central and local 
governments priorities could be. From this perspec-
tive HDI disaggregation is not about the ranking 
of municipalities or groups but about the way each 
municipality has achieved its HDI value (good eco-
nomic performance at the expense of health or good 
educational opportunities offsetting delays in other 
areas). HDI disaggregation helps local governments 
determine the areas/problems on which they should 
focus their policies.
Last but not least, as is the case with all statistical 
measures the HDI should  be used with caution and 
always within a specific context. In practical terms 
calculating the HDI at a subnational level presents 
a number of the methodological challenges. While 
measuring human development at a subnation-
al level is more interesting from a policy point of 
view, data issues at this level are more pronounced. 
On the one hand, when using a smaller population 
sample, the impact that random events have on the 
data is more likely to distort or overshadow system-
ic differences. On the other hand, indicators taken 
from subnational level data can also create distorted 
calculations if not carefully selected. For instance, 
an uneven geographical distribution of educational 
institutions could artificially affect enrolment rates, 
while in reality children from distant municipalities 
(where enrolment rates will be artificially lower) 
still have an opportunity to pursue a higher educa-
tion in capital-based universities (where enrolment 
rates will be artificially higher). 
While GDP measurements are not available at the 
municipality level, what we are really aiming to 
measure are ‘decent standards of living’, which 
can be proxied by other indicators. The municipal-
ity HDI makes use of the KMS of 2012 which was 
jointly funded by the USAID and the Norwegian 
government. It makes a number of assumptions, as 
described below. In general, indicators of munici-
palities were calculated by using Kosovo averages 
that were indexed using available proxies in the fol-
lowing way. Where X*i is an estimated indicator for 
municipality i, X is a average value for Kosovo, Pi 
is a value of proxy indicators for municipality i and 
P is an average value of a proxy indicator for Koso-
vo.4
Health index
Data on the life expectancy in Kosovo is available 
from “Statistikat e Vdekjeve 2012”. Due to the 
small size of municipalities in Kosovo, mortality 
data, even if it were  available for Kosovo would 
be likely to skew life expectancy calculations. The 
Mosaic survey includes a number of questions relat-
ed to health, but unfortunately none of them are on 
health outcome or output level. One available indi-
cator is the affordability of health care,5 however, it 
has certain limitations. 
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Xἱ*= X*(Pἱ)P
4Strictly speaking, this assumes perfect correlation between the target indicator and proxy indicator, i.e. if the proxy indicator changes by x%, the target 
indicator also changes by x%. This potential risk is addressed by careful selection of proxy indicators (discussed below), which should have the same 
nature as the target indicator.
5Question Q-34. ‘Tell me, which of the following are affordable for your household? c) Expenses of treating a flu or any other minor illness of any family 
member’, scale Affordable, Not affordable
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The data refers to current, temporary problems re-
lated to the ability to afford basic treatment, but 
says nothing about the long-term consequences of 
these problems.  A better indicator, which was used 
for calculations in this report is the actual access to 
health care services.6 Calculations done at the mu-
nicipal level, regarding individuals who experience 
significant barriers to health care access in 5 key 
areas (distance, time, waiting time, cost of consul-
tations, and cost of medicines), were factored into 
calculations for the average life expectancy index.7 
Such “hardcore” problems with access to health 
care will inevitably lead to long-term problems with 
health, captured through life expectancy. The value 
of three possible proxy indicators for health index 
are summarised in Table 2. 
Education index
The education index includes two components—
the present status of education, captured by mean 
years of schooling, and the assumed future status of 
education, captured by expected years of schooling 
(which is calculated using enrolment rates).While 
the Mosaic survey captures information on the 
achieved level of education8 (though in a scaled lev-
el achieved format, not in actual years of education), 
the survey did not contain questions related to the 
current enrolment of children. Therefore, both ex-
pected years of schooling and mean years of school-
ing were indexed using the structure of achieved ed-
ucation weighted by assumed years of schooling for 
each level achieved. Data is summarised in Table 3.
Income Index
The income index is designed to capture and com-
pare living standards of people. On the internation-
al level GNI per capita in purchasing power parity 
seems to be the best available indicator. However, 
on the municipal level, this indicator becomes irrel-
evant. The Mosaic survey database includes a vari-
able for household per capita expenditures (in Euros 
per month), which was used as a proxy variable for 
indexing a national GNI indicator. As this indicator 
directly measures expenditures of households, it is a 
good proxy of living standards, providing local pric-
es which do not differ significantly. Table 4 sum-
marises the mean household per capita expenditures 
by municipalities, used for indexing GNI.
Table 1. Sample size of Mosaic 2012 survey by municipalities
Municipality Freq. Percent Cum.
Prishtina/Priština 264 3.94 3.94
Mitrovica 304 4.54 8.48
Gjilan/Gnjilane 200 2.99 11.46
Peja/Peć 200 2.99 14.45
Prizren 240 3.58 18.03
Gjakova/Đakovica 200 2.99 21.01
Podujevë/Podujevo 200 2.99 24
Vushtrri/Vučitrn 200 2.99 26.99
Skënderaj/Srbica 200 2.99 29.97
Leposaviq/ Leposavič 200 2.99 32.96
Klinë/Klina 200 2.99 35.94
Istog/Istok 200 2.99 38.93
Deçan/Dečane 200 2.99 41.91
Dragash/Dragaš 200 2.99 44.9
Suharekë /Suva Reka 200 2.99 47.88
Rahovec/Orahovac 200 2.99 50.87
Viti/Vitina 200 2.99 53.85
Kamenicë/Kamenica 200 2.99 56.84
Lipjan 200 2.99 59.82
Shtime/ Štimlje 200 2.99 62.81
Ferizaj/ Uroševac 200 2.99 65.79
 6 Question Q11. ‘On the last occasion you needed to see a doctor or medical specialist, how big of a problem, if any, were each of the following?’ (Scale 
from 1 to 4, whereby 1 means a very big problem and 4 means no problem at all). A. Distance to doctor’s office/ hospital/ medical centre; B. Time to get 
an appointment; C. Waiting time to be seen by the doctor on day of appointment; D. Cost of seeing the doctor; E. Cost of buying medicine.
  7 Strictly speaking, we used reverse indicator, share of those who do not have very big problems in access to health care.
  8 Question D1d. ‘Highest education level attained’ (for each household member older than 18):
1.None, 2.Unfinished primary, 3.Primary, 4.Secondary, 5.Higher School, 6.University.
Kaçanik/Kačanik 200 2.99 68.78
Fushë Kosova/ Kosovo Polje 200 2.99 71.76
Obiliq/Obilič 200 2.99 74.75
Novobërda/ Novo Brdo 96 1.43 76.18
Zubin Potok 104 1.55 77.73
Shtërpcë/ Štrpce 160 2.39 80.12
Zveçan /Zvečan 112 1.67 81.79
Gllogoc/ Glogovac 200 2.99 84.78
Malisheva/Mališevo 200 2.99 87.76
Junik 104 1.55 89.31
Mamusha/Mamuša 104 1.55 90.87
Hani I Elezit/Elez Han 104 1.55 92.42
Graçanica/Gračanica 200 2.99 95.4
Ranillug/Ranilug 104 1.55 96.96
Partesh/Parteš 104 1.55 98.51
Kllokoti/Klokot 100 1.49 100
Total 6,700 100
Table 2. Proxy indicators of health at municipal level
Municipality
Affordable: can afford 
expenses of treating a flu or 
any other minor illness of any 
family member (Q34)
Experienced very big problem 
in all five aspects last time 
needed medical assistance 
(Q11)
Experienced big and very big 
problem in all five aspects last 
time needed medical assistance 
(Q11)
Prishtina/Priština 79 7 25
Mitrovica 80 1 13
Gjilan/Gnjilane 70 10 11
Peja/Peć 55 4 21
Prizren 76 5 13
Gjakova/Đakovica 52 7 18
Podujevë/Podujevo 67 5 10
Vushtrri/Vučitrn 76 2 7
Skënderaj / Srbica 90 6 21
Leposaviq/Leposavič 95 0 6
Klinë/Klina 47 6 15
Istog/Istok 51 0 10
Deçan/Dečane 38 5 23
Dragash/Dragaš 75 4 13
Suharekë /Suva Reka 79 9 15
Rahovec/Orahovac 45 18 35
Viti/Vitina 84 4 13
Kamenicë/Kamenica 61 2 6
Lipjan 45 2 9
Shtime/ Štimlje 51 4 10
Ferizaj/ Uroševac 51 1 7
Kaçanik/Kačanik 56 0 8
Fushë Kosova/ Kosovo Polje 70 5 29
Obiliq/Obilič 58 9 30
Novobërda/ Novo Brdo 61 1 19
Zubin Potok 95 2 15
Shtërpcë/ Štrpce 73 3 9
Zveçan /Zvečan 95 1 3
Gllogoc/Glogovac 69 11 25
Malisheva/Mališevo 66 10 24
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Junik 64 2 33
Mamusha/ Mamuša 82 9 16
Hani I Elezit/ Elez Han 69 1 13
Graçanica/Gračanica 91 2 7
Ranillug/Ranilug 82 16 28
Partesh/Parteš 72 11 38
Kllokoti/Klokot 79 6 18
Total 66 5 16
Table 3. Structure of achieved education by municipality and assumed years in school for each level
Municipality None
Unfinished 
primary Primary Secondary Higher School University
Prishtina/Priština 2% 5% 15% 47% 5% 25%
Mitrovica 3% 2% 26% 54% 5% 9%
Gjilan/Gnjilane 4% 4% 28% 52% 5% 7%
Peja/Peć 3% 8% 29% 47% 4% 9%
Prizren 3% 9% 44% 36% 2% 6%
Gjakova/Đakovica 5% 6% 43% 33% 5% 9%
Podujevë/Podujevo 5% 8% 25% 47% 3% 11%
Vushtrri/Vučitrn 3% 6% 24% 57% 3% 7%
Skënderaj/Srbica 6% 9% 25% 54% 2% 4%
Leposaviq/Leposavič 1% 5% 14% 58% 11% 11%
Klinë/Klina 9% 9% 30% 43% 3% 6%
Istog/Istok 5% 7% 28% 46% 2% 10%
Deçan/Dečane 4% 7% 30% 47% 3% 8%
Dragash/Dragaš 3% 9% 44% 36% 3% 6%
Suharekë/Suva Reka 7% 9% 35% 37% 3% 9%
Rahovec/Orahovac 5% 12% 42% 30% 3% 7%
Viti/Vitina 4% 5% 24% 52% 6% 10%
Kamenicë/Kamenica 10% 6% 28% 44% 4% 9%
Lipjan 6% 9% 26% 47% 3% 9%
Shtime/ Štimlje 6% 9% 33% 46% 1% 4%
Ferizaj/ Uroševac 7% 12% 27% 44% 2% 7%
Kaçanik/Kačanik 4% 8% 31% 48% 2% 7%
Fushë Kosova/ Kosovo Polje 6% 4% 20% 54% 2% 13%
Obiliq/Obilič 5% 8% 22% 56% 4% 5%
Novobërda/ Novo Brdo 4% 8% 31% 49% 6% 3%
Zubin Potok 0% 4% 9% 69% 11% 6%
Shtërpcë/Štrpce 2% 9% 25% 51% 8% 5%
Zveçan /Zvečan 2% 3% 9% 59% 16% 12%
Gllogoc/Glogovac 4% 5% 27% 53% 4% 7%
Malisheva/Mališevo 3% 6% 47% 36% 2% 5%
Junik 7% 7% 48% 30% 2% 6%
Mamusha/ Mamuša 6% 15% 61% 15% 1% 2%
Hani I Elezit/ Elez Han 3% 13% 33% 44% 1% 5%
Graçanica/Gračanica 1% 5% 13% 74% 3% 4%
Ranillug/Ranilug 4% 2% 23% 56% 11% 3%
Partesh/Parteš 8% 4% 25% 52% 8% 2%
Kllokoti/Klokot 14% 3% 20% 36% 17% 10%
Total 5% 7% 31% 45% 4% 8%
Assumed years in school 0 2 4 9 12 15
Table 4. Mean household per capita expenditures by municipality
Municipality
Mean household per capita 
expenditures, euro per month Lower bound Upper bound
Prishtina/Priština 148.7 131.1 166.2
Mitrovica 87.5 78.6 96.4
Gjilan/Gnjilane 61.1 55.7 66.5
Peja/Peć 87.8 79.4 96.2
Prizren 87.6 77.5 97.8
Gjakova/Đakovica 82.3 70.8 93.8
Podujevë/Podujevo 76.3 67.4 85.1
Vushtrri/Vučitrn 71.5 63.0 80.0
Skënderaj/Srbica 54.0 47.1 60.9
Leposaviq/Leposavič 139.1 126.6 151.6
Klinë/ Klina 75.1 68.1 82.1
Istog/Istok 56.3 52.0 60.6
Deçan/Dečane 60.6 55.8 65.4
Dragash/Dragaš 80.6 74.8 86.3
Suharekë /Suva Reka 88.9 79.7 98.0
Rahovec/Orahovac 65.1 59.9 70.3
Viti/Vitina 62.7 54.2 71.2
Kamenicë/Kamenica 74.6 67.5 81.7
Lipjan 71.8 65.7 77.9
Shtime/ Štimlje 67.3 61.0 73.6
Ferizaj/ Uroševac 74.7 66.6 82.7
Kaçanik/Kačanik 71.0 65.4 76.7
Fushë Kosova/ Kosovo Polje 99.3 86.4 112.2
Obiliq/Obilič 79.1 72.8 85.4
Novobërda/ Novo Brdo 66.6 58.2 75.0
Zubin Potok 148.1 133.0 163.2
Shtërpcë/ Štrpce 80.3 72.0 88.7
Zveçan /Zvečan 143.5 125.3 161.7
Gllogoc/Glogovac 66.3 61.3 71.2
Malisheva/Mališevo 57.9 52.1 63.7
Junik 82.4 72.6 92.1
Mamusha/ Mamuša 60.6 51.9 69.3
Hani I Elezit/ Elez Han 76.5 66.8 86.2
Graçanica/Gračanica 81.1 74.3 88.0
Ranillug/Ranilug 87.2 75.1 99.4
Partesh/Parteš 62.7 57.2 68.2
Kllokoti/Klokot 63.7 54.0 73.5
Total 79.0 77.4 80.6
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Table 5. HDI and its components on Kosovo Municipal Basis
Municipality Health 
Index
Education 
Index
Income 
Index
HDI Health Education Incomes
Life expec-
tancy, 
years, 
estimated
Mean years 
of Schooling
Expected 
years of 
schooling
GNI per 
capita ($) 
PPP, 
estimated
Prishtina/Priština 0.869 0.971 0.765 0.864 75.1 13.3 18.0 17,772
Mitrovica 0.944 0.908 0.686 0.838 79.9 11.7 15.9 10,460
Gjilan/Gnjilane 0.839 0.859 0.633 0.770 73.2 11.1 15.1 7,306
Peja/Peć 0.916 0.837 0.687 0.807 78.1 10.8 14.7 10,492
Prizren 0.891 0.725 0.687 0.763 76.5 9.3 12.7 10,475
Gjakova/Đakovica 0.871 0.764 0.677 0.767 75.2 9.8 13.4 9,839
Podujevë/Podujevo 0.897 0.855 0.666 0.799 76.9 11.0 15.0 9,116
Vushtrri/Vučitrn 0.941 0.866 0.657 0.812 79.7 11.1 15.2 8,551
Skënderaj/Srbica 0.883 0.786 0.615 0.753 76.0 10.1 13.8 6,456
Leposaviq/Leposavič 0.960 0.971 0.755 0.890 80.9 12.9 17.6 16,631
Klinë/ Klina 0.884 0.748 0.664 0.760 76.0 9.6 13.1 8,978
Istog/Istok 0.960 0.827 0.621 0.790 80.9 10.6 14.5 6,731
Deçan/Dečane 0.897 0.818 0.632 0.774 76.8 10.5 14.4 7,242
Dragash/Dragaš 0.915 0.731 0.674 0.767 78.0 9.4 12.8 9,630
Suharekë /Suva Reka 0.852 0.750 0.689 0.761 74.0 9.6 13.2 10,625
Rahovec/Orahovac 0.731 0.699 0.643 0.690 66.3 9.0 12.3 7,781
Viti/Vitina 0.909 0.907 0.637 0.807 77.6 11.7 15.9 7,499
Kamenicë/Kamenica 0.941 0.785 0.663 0.788 79.7 10.1 13.8 8,916
Lipjan 0.935 0.810 0.657 0.792 79.3 10.4 14.2 8,585
Shtime/ Štimlje 0.916 0.739 0.648 0.760 78.1 9.5 13.0 8,049
Ferizaj/ Uroševac 0.947 0.763 0.663 0.783 80.1 9.8 13.4 8,928
Kaçanik/Kačanik 0.960 0.804 0.656 0.797 80.9 10.3 14.1 8,493
Fushë Kosova/ Kosovo 
Polje
0.903 0.915 0.705 0.835 77.2 11.8 16.1 11,871
Obiliq/Obilič 0.851 0.836 0.672 0.782 74.0 10.7 14.7 9,460
Novobërda/ Novo Brdo 0.946 0.787 0.646 0.783 80.0 10.1 13.8 7,958
Zubin Potok 0.936 0.971 0.764 0.886 79.3 13.1 17.8 17,708
Shtërpcë/ Štrpce 0.926 0.852 0.674 0.810 78.7 10.9 14.9 9,604
Zveçan /Zvečan 0.949 0.971 0.760 0.888 80.2 13.3 18.0 17,155
Gllogoc/Glogovac 0.823 0.852 0.645 0.768 72.2 11.0 15.0 7,921
Malisheva/Mališevo 0.832 0.718 0.626 0.720 72.7 9.2 12.6 6,921
Junik 0.936 0.671 0.678 0.752 79.3 8.6 11.8 9,845
Mamusha/ Mamuša 0.850 0.515 0.632 0.652 73.9 6.6 9.0 7,245
Hani I Elezit/ Elez Han 0.948 0.735 0.667 0.774 80.1 9.4 12.9 9,143
Graçanica/Gračanica 0.936 0.938 0.675 0.840 79.3 12.1 16.5 9,700
Ranillug/Ranilug 0.752 0.899 0.686 0.774 67.7 11.6 15.8 10,430
Partesh/Parteš 0.825 0.810 0.637 0.753 72.3 10.4 14.2 7,498
Kllokoti/Klokot 0.878 0.870 0.640 0.788 75.7 11.2 15.3 7,617
Kosovo average 0.895 0.810 0.671 0.786 76.75 10.4 14.2 9,446
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